add check for CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE=0x0 too about kernel-hardening-checker

[thestinger]

There's just GrapheneOS/kernel_common-6.6@af734cc.

[a13xp0p0v]

Hello @thestinger ,

Thanks for the idea.

Collecting all pieces together, we can have the following rules:

l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ', 'is not set'),
         KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE', '0x0'))]
...
l += [CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'sysrq_always_enabled', 'is not set')]
...
l += [SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'my', 'kernel.sysrq', '0')]

Do you agree?

[thestinger]

MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE being set to 0x0 without being enabled via sysrq_always_enabled or kernel.sysrq should provide similar benefits. It's probably still best to fully disable the functionality.

Disabling it via the sysctl alone leaves a gap in early boot where it's enabled if MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE is 0x1 which seemed like a problem.

There's also MAGIC_SYSRQ_SERIAL for controlling whether sysrq can be enabled via the serial port. Having that enabled is a potential hole although it depends on having something implementing it.

I think either having MAGIC_SYSRQ disabled or having MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE set to 0x0 + MAGIC_SYSRQ_SERIAL disabled + not overriding it via kernel command line or kernel.sysrq is fine.

Android sets kernel.sysrq in early boot but yet lots of devices enable it via sysrq_always_enabled on the kernel command line and disabling in early boot also doesn't really seem right since there's a gap between the kernel being ready and init disabling it.

[a13xp0p0v]

Hello @thestinger,

Thanks again for your explanation.

I added:

• the MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE check: 48ff855
• the kernel.sysrq check: 538af12
• the MAGIC_SYSRQ_SERIAL check: d995dd6

Do you like it?

[a13xp0p0v]

By the way, the KSPP added this recommendation:

CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE=176

It allows sync, remount read-only and reboot/poweroff.

@thestinger, what do you think about it?

[a13xp0p0v]

Hi @thestinger!

Currently, these sysrq checks in kernel-hardening-checker are marked as my recommendations.
But it would be nice to mark them as GrapheneOS recommendations.
Could you give a link to the GrapheneOS documentation or code enforcing this configuration?
I would put it to the references.

And what do you think about CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE=176 recommended by KSPP?

[thestinger]

We don't really need credit for it particularly since many of the KSPP recommendations came from us anyway.

[a13xp0p0v]

I mean the sysrq checks that I developed according to this issue #104:

l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ', 'is not set'),
         KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE', '0x0'))]
l += [OR(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ_SERIAL', 'is not set'),
         KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE', '0x0'))]

l += [CmdlineCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'sysrq_always_enabled', 'is not set')]

l += [OR(SysctlCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'a13xp0p0v', 'kernel.sysrq', '0'),
         AND(KconfigCheck('cut_attack_surface', 'clipos', 'MAGIC_SYSRQ', 'is not set'),
             have_kconfig))]

They are currently marked as clipos or a13xp0p0v.
They are more restrictive than the KSPP recommendation.

Is it possible to refer to the GrapheneOS documentation or code for these checks?

[thestinger]

You can see our overall core kernel changes here:

https://github.com/GrapheneOS/kernel_common-6.6/commits/15/

Bear in mind we're starting from the Android Generic Kernel Image configuration with Clang CFI, etc. already enabled and some downstream hardening features. Android uses strict full system SELinux policies and that is what gets used to restrict eBPF, io_uring, userfaultfd, ioctl commands, dmesg, perf events, etc. rather than very coarse kernel features that are close to all or nothing. This means most things related to restricting userspace access aren't relevant since SELinux policy is used. We also introduce our own extensions to SELinux.

Some our hardening is hardware-specific so it's outside of this GKI repository.

As an example of how a feature can be spread out across a bunch of areas, we have this USB-C / pogo pins port control feature for reducing attack surface while locked at both a software (kernel) and hardware (USB-C / pogo pins controller) level:

https://grapheneos.org/features#usb-c-port-and-pogo-pins-control

Due to this feature, disabling SYSRQ support isn't very relevant since we disable USB at a hardware and software level anyway.

Here's our software-level USB protection infrastructure in the kernel:

GrapheneOS/kernel_common-6.6@777f92a
GrapheneOS/kernel_common-6.6@7da1fe7
GrapheneOS/kernel_common-6.6@57b0d1c
GrapheneOS/kernel_common-6.6@1b31f2c

Hardware-level USB-C and pogo pins protection infrastructure:

https://github.com/GrapheneOS/kernel_google-modules_soc_gs/commits/14/ and
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/kernel_gs/commits/14/ (USB-C driver)
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/kernel_devices_google_tangorpro/commits/14/ (pogo pins driver)

The userspace part is spread across several repositories, at least these:

https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_frameworks_base/commits/14/ (tiny portion of our changes there are relevant)
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_sepolicy/commits/14/ (small portion of our changes there are relevant)
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_Settings/commits/14/ (tiny portion of our changes there are relevant)
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/device_google_gs101/commits/14/ (small portion of our changes there are relevant)
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/device_google_gs201/commits/14/ (small portion of our changes there are relevant)
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/device_google_zuma/commits/14/ (small portion of our changes there are relevant)

Just as an example of one of our major features which involves kernel changes. There are others, and we try to put as much as possible in SELinux, etc. as possible rather than changing the kernel so there's not really that much there especially since we try to upstream stuff.

[thestinger]

There are GKI repositories for 5.10, 5.15, 6.1 and 6.6 but soon only the 6.1 and 6.6 ones will be relevant once Pixels all move to 6.1 which hopefully happens sooner rather than later. 6th/7th gen Pixels have out-of-tree drivers built from kernel/gs (kernel_gs) but 8th gen onwards have moved to having small repositories used with the GKI common kernel repository instead rather than both the common kernel repository for the kernel image / generic modules and another device kernel repository. Will go away for 6th/7th gen Pixels when they move to a newer kernel. Anyway, it's spread out more than you'd probably think. We've also been trying to do as much as we can via SELinux, seccomp-bpf and userspace code rather than patching the kernel when not necessary. When things get a bit cleaner when Pixels move to newer GKI branches and the last device kernel repository is gone (kernel_gs), we'll probably start making more kernel changes again such as making our hardened allocator with a best in class MTE implementation as we did in userspace.