Users may unintendedly remove liquidity under a phishing attack. about 2021-04-vader-findings

[strictly-scarce]

If a user has been phished, consider all their funds already stolen.

Vader's security assumption is a user is not phished.

[Mervyn853]

Our decision matrix for severity:

0: No-risk: Code style, clarity, off-chain monitoring (events etc), exclude gas-optimisations
1: Low Risk: UX, state handling, function incorrect as to spec
2: Funds-Not-At-Risk, but can impact the functioning of the protocol, or leak value with a hypothetical attack path with stated assumptions, but external requirements
3: Funds can be stolen/lost directly, or indirectly if a valid attack path shown that does not have handwavey hypotheticals.

Recommended: 0

[dmvt]

This is reasonably easy to mitigate as an issue and failure to do so does leave an attack vector open. If exploited it will result in a loss of user funds.