0xFredrik/testing

★ 0Forks 0GitHub ↗Compare

README

Ethereum Access Layer Personas

Access Paths

Ethereum's protocol layer creates credible neutrality.

The issue is that personas does not interact with Ethereum directly. Today, most users interact through:

device
→ OS
→ network
→ browser/app
→ frontend
→ wallet
→ RPC
→ mempool
→ execution

In the future, it is likely this will shift more towards:

device
→ OS
→ network
→ LLM
→ RPC
→ mempool
→ execution

Personas

AI delegating user Average Ethereum user Cypherpunk sovereign user Journalist in oppressed country Journalist in western country NGO / open-source foundation worker Non-financial issuer / operator Non-financial participant / verifier Institutional ETH holder / DAT / ETF-like actor Bank / regulated financial institution Dapp developer On-chain trader / DeFi power user Unbanked / underbanked user Small merchant in unstable economy Global Freelancer Humanitarian aid operator Home validator / solo staker Corporate treasury / web3 startup

Average Ethereum user

The average user is aware they are using Ethereum, but is unaware that they are at the same time depending on a long string of supply chain intermediaries.

Ethereum protocol is decentralized, but the user's path is centralized at nearly every access point.

Access stack

Layer Typical dependency
Device iPhone, Android, laptop
OS iOS, Android, macOS, Windows
Network ISP, mobile carrier, Wi-Fi
App/browser Wallet app, dapp frontend, in-app browser
Wallet Browser wallet, mobile wallet, embedded wallet
RPC Default external RPC
Data Indexer, explorer, token list, price API
Meta layer DNS, CDN, frontend hosting, chain config, simulation API
Chain L1, L2, bridge, contract
Recovery Email, seed phrase, cloud backup, social recovery

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 4
Open source 3
Privacy 4
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • The wallet is honest.
  • The RPC is honest and available.
  • The frontend is not compromised.
  • DNS/CDN serves the right code.
  • The indexer shows correct data.
  • Token metadata is not spoofed.
  • The simulation API is correct.
  • The L2 sequencer includes the transaction.
  • The recovery provider cannot capture the account.
  • The user can exit if the app, frontend, RPC, L2, or recovery provider fails.

Access Layer failure

The user thinks they are using Ethereum directly, but their practical path depends on centralized RPCs, hosted frontends, token metadata, indexers, simulation APIs, wallet defaults, app stores, and recovery providers.

Access Layer asks

  • CROPS access receipt.
  • Wallet-visible trust assumptions.
  • RPC portability.
  • Private reads.
  • Verifiable frontends.
  • Verified metadata.
  • Clear-signing and local simulation.
  • Credible recovery and exit paths.

Cypherpunk sovereign user

This user wants maximum self-sovereignty. They assume states, ISPs, exchanges, app stores, RPCs, analytics firms, hosted frontends, and cloud providers can become adversarial.

Ethereum gives this user a neutral execution and settlement layer that does not require permission from banks, states, payment processors, cloud providers, app stores, or custodians.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer ThinkPad, System76, Framework, custom desktop
Desktop OS Qubes OS, Tails, Debian, Whonix, OpenBSD
Mobile Pixel
Mobile OS GrapheneOS
Network Tor, Tor bridges, VPN, multiple ISPs
Browser Tor Browser
Wallet Hardware wallet, air-gapped signer, multisig
RPC/node Own Ethereum node, light client, fallback RPCs, local inference model
Frontend Local frontend, static frontend, IPFS, reproducible builds
Recovery Metal backups, multisigs, geographically separated shares

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 5
Open source 5
Privacy 5
Security 5

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Private, independent state access
Write Censorship-resistant transaction propagation
Prove Minimal-disclosure claims
Delegate Narrow, revocable delegation only
Exit Full portability across wallets, nodes, frontends, networks

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Local node or light client verifies state instead of trusting external RPC.
  • Frontends are reproducible, signed, locally hosted, or otherwise verifiable.
  • Token metadata and chain configuration are verified, not blindly trusted.
  • Private reads do not leak wallet graph or IP address.
  • Transaction construction can be independently checked.
  • L2, bridge, and sequencer assumptions are understood before funds are moved there.
  • AI tools, if used, run locally and never become signing authority.

Access Layer failure

Even if the user runs their own node, CROPS can still fail through compromised dapp UIs, spoofed metadata, bridge frontends, L2 sequencer APIs, hosted simulation services, or unsafe wallet signing flows.

Asks

  • CROPS wallet with Tor-native support.
  • Verifiable frontends.
  • Verifiable RPC.
  • Private reads.
  • Encrypted/private mempool options.
  • Metadata verification.
  • Plausible-deniability wallet modes.
  • Transaction construction that can be independently verified.
  • Local-first dapp interfaces.
  • Strong account portability and credible exits.

Journalist in oppressed country

A journalist who investigates state violence, corruption, war crimes, or election fraud. They face surveillance, banking censorship, device seizure, border search, source exposure, and physical risk.

Ethereum can provide funding, emergency savings, censorship-resistant payments, and provenance tools when local banks and media infrastructure are compromised.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer Cheap laptop, sometimes shared or second-hand
Desktop OS Tails, Ubuntu, Windows, Qubes if advanced
Mobile Android phone, ideally GrapheneOS if available
Network Censored mobile ISP, public Wi-Fi, Tor bridges, VPN
Browser Tor Browser
Wallet Mobile wallet, hidden wallet, emergency wallet
RPC Default RPC, ideally private RPC or Tor-compatible route
Frontend Donation page, wallet app, stablecoin app, publishing/provenance page
Recovery Memorized backup, trusted foreign contact, split recovery

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Check funds without revealing IP, location, or wallet graph
Write Receive and move funds even under censorship
Prove Prove authorship or eligibility without revealing legal identity
Delegate Allow emergency recovery without surrendering funds
Exit Recover if phone, wallet, ISP, app store, or country becomes hostile

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 5
Open source 4
Privacy 5
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Wallet does not leak metadata.
  • RPC does not link IP to address.
  • Donation frontend is not compromised.
  • Wallet notifications do not expose activity.
  • Public address reuse does not expose donors/sources.
  • Recovery helpers cannot steal funds.
  • Token metadata and stablecoin identity are authentic.
  • Publishing/provenance tools do not expose sources.

Access Layer failure

The journalist receives funds but exposes their donors, sources, location, or escape route through RPC logs, public address reuse, notifications, exchange links, browser metadata, or device seizure.

Access Layer asks

  • Wallets
    • No-notification / stealth mode.
    • Decoy wallet.
    • Duress mode.
    • Privacy.
    • Address rotation.
    • Private reads.
    • Tor-native transaction submission.
  • Source-safe payment playbooks.
  • Signed donation and publishing frontends.
  • Plausible-deniability tooling.

Journalist in western country

A journalist in a democratic country investigates governments, corporations, surveillance vendors, corruption, or financial crime. They need source protection, donor privacy, legal resilience, and public provenance.

Ethereum can support independent funding, source payments, document timestamping, provenance, public-interest grants, and censorship-resistant publication infrastructure.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer MacBook, Windows laptop, Linux laptop
OS macOS, Windows, Ubuntu
Mobile iPhone or Android
Network Newsroom network, home ISP, mobile data, VPN
Browser Firefox, Chrome, Tor Browser
Wallet Hardware wallet, browser wallet, donation wallet
RPC Wallet default
Frontend Donation site, publishing site, DAO/grant frontend
Recovery Hardware-wallet backup, newsroom process

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Monitor funds without linking all activity
Write Refund/Pay sources or contributors safely
Prove Timestamp documents or prove provenance
Delegate Let newsroom finance/legal staff manage funds
Exit Rotate wallets and migrate donation infrastructure

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 3
Open source 4
Privacy 5
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Frontends are authentic.
  • Donor graph is not trivially exposed.
  • Wallet does not merge identities.
  • RPC/indexer does not leak sensitive lookups.
  • Hosted publishing/donation infrastructure remains available.
  • Transaction history does not reveal sources.
  • Document timestamping/provenance does not reveal more than intended.
  • Donation, grant, or legal-defense pages can be migrated if pressured or censored.

Access Layer failure

A public donation address becomes a surveillance endpoint that reveals donors, sources, travel, subscriptions, legal-defense funding, and operational behavior.

Access Layer asks

  • Source-safe payment playbooks.
  • Signed donation frontends.
  • Wallet identity separation.
  • Private donor flows.
  • Provenance tools with selective disclosure.

NGO / open-source foundation worker

An NGO, civil-liberties group, or open-source foundation receives donations, sends grants, funds public goods, and protects vulnerable recipients.

Ethereum enables global grants, public-goods funding, transparent treasury management, and permissionless coordination.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer MacBook, ThinkPad
OS macOS, Ubuntu, Arch, Qubes
Mobile iPhone or Android
Network Office ISP, corporate VPN
Browser Chrome, Firefox
Wallet Safe multisig, hardware signers
RPC Public RPC, sometimes own node
Frontend Safe UI, grant dashboard, DAO tools
Data Indexers, accounting exports, grant databases

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Monitor treasury and grant status
Write Send grants globally
Prove Prove fund usage or grant milestones
Delegate Let staff sign within limits
Exit Rotate signers, migrate treasury, change frontends/RPCs

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 4
Open source 5
Privacy 4
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Frontend is authentic.
  • RPC is available and uncensored.
  • Accounting/indexer data is correct.
  • Public treasury flows do not endanger grantees.
  • Signers understand transactions.
  • Grant dashboards do not expose vulnerable recipients.
  • Donations, grants, and public reporting do not collapse recipient privacy.
  • Alternative frontends and RPCs exist if the main provider disappears.

Access Layer failure

The NGO may experience compromised frontends or exposes recipients through public grant flows.

Access Layer asks

  • Sender/Receiver privacy.
  • Verifiable frontends.
  • Clear-signing for multisig actions.
  • Public transparency with private recipients.
  • Recipient-risk threat models.
  • Private grant disbursement patterns.

Non-financial issuer / operator

A sophisticated actor wants to run or issue something onchain where the primary purpose is not financial transfer.

Examples include a DAO running an onchain vote, a cooperative running a member vote, a local government running a public consultation, an open-source project publishing onchain version history, a maintainer publishing release attestations, a certificate authority publishing revocations, a university issuing credentials, or a standards body publishing voting eligibility.

Ethereum gives this actor a neutral public record, tamper resistance, global verifiability, censorship resistance, durable audit trails, and open infrastructure.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer Managed laptop or developer workstation
OS macOS, Linux, Windows
Wallet Safe multisig, hardware wallet, smart account
RPC/node Own node, managed RPC, fallback RPC
Frontend Voting UI, revocation UI, version-control UI, attestation UI
Data Indexers, membership lists, attestations, proofs
Proving ZK membership / eligibility proofs
Sponsorship Paymaster or gas sponsor
Recovery Admin key rotation, multisig recovery, exit process

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Operator verifies system state and participation
Write Operator publishes votes, revocations, releases, attestations, or registries
Prove Operator verifies eligibility without exposing unnecessary data
Delegate Operator delegates admin rights safely
Exit Participants can verify or participate if the operator frontend disappears

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 5
Open source 5
Privacy 4
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Operator frontend is authentic.
  • Vote, certificate, or version-control UI is not compromised.
  • Membership proofs are correct.
  • Sponsor cannot selectively include users.
  • Indexer does not hide votes, revocations, releases, or attestations.
  • Participants can verify results independently.
  • Admin keys cannot alter outcomes after the fact.
  • The contract state is readable without trusting the operator.

Access Layer failure

The operator runs a “decentralized” vote, revocation registry, release system, or attestation system, but users still depend on one frontend, one sponsor, one RPC, one indexer, or one admin.

Access Layer asks

  • Signed/verifiable frontends.
  • Public templates for onchain voting.
  • Public templates for certificate revocation.
  • Public templates for version and release attestations.
  • Verifiable membership systems.
  • ZK eligibility proofs.
  • Non-discretionary gas sponsorship.
  • Verifiable indexers.
  • Simple audit views.
  • Emergency frontend and RPC fallback.

Non-financial participant / verifier

This person is not necessarily an Ethereum user. They are using Ethereum because an institution, DAO, cooperative, government, project, or standard chose Ethereum as the public verification layer.

This may be their first and only Ethereum interaction.

Examples include a DAO member voting once, a citizen voting in a local consultation, a cooperative member voting on a proposal, an employee checking credential validity, a browser or OS checking certificate revocation, a developer verifying package release provenance, or a user checking whether a certificate, credential, software release, or vote has been revoked or modified.

Ethereum provides a public verification layer that can outlive the operator and resist tampering.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Device Mobile phone or ordinary laptop
OS iOS, Android, macOS, Windows
Browser Normal browser, no extension
Wallet None, embedded wallet, passkey wallet, one-time smart account
ETH balance Usually zero
RPC Hidden behind app/frontend
Read client Needs proof-carrying UI or embedded light-client verification
Sponsorship Gas paid automatically by rules, not by operator discretion
Proving ZK proof of membership/eligibility
Recovery Usually not relevant, unless persistent membership account exists

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Verify result, revocation, release, or vote without trusting the operator
Write Vote or submit action without owning ETH
Prove Prove membership or eligibility privately
Delegate Rare; may delegate vote or signing authority
Exit Verify or participate if the main UI is down or censored

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 5
Open source 4
Privacy 5 for voting; 3-4 for verification
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • UI shows the real proposal, certificate, or release.
  • Vote choices are not modified by the frontend.
  • Membership proof does not reveal identity.
  • Gas sponsorship is not discretionary.
  • Operator cannot choose whose transactions get sponsored.
  • Participant can verify the result without installing crypto tooling.
  • The read path is not just a trusted hosted API.
  • The wallet or passkey flow does not become a new lock-in.

Access Layer failure

The participant cannot vote or verify unless the central operator provides a working website, pays gas for them, and tells them what the chain says. That reintroduces the operator as the trusted party.

Access Layer asks

  • Browser-native or embedded light-client verification.
  • Proof-carrying onchain UIs.
  • No-extension verification flows.
  • Passkey or one-time smart accounts.
  • Gas sponsorship based on ZK eligibility proofs.
  • Private voting or privacy-preserving participation.
  • Public fallback frontend.
  • Simple receipts proving what was submitted.
  • Verifiable result pages.

Non-discretionary sponsorship

For non-financial use cases, sponsorship should not depend on the operator choosing whose transactions to pay for.

Bad model:

operator decides whose transactions to sponsor

Better model:

anyone who proves eligibility gets sponsored automatically

Example:

Sponsor transaction if:
- user proves membership in the eligible set,
- user has not already voted,
- transaction calls the approved voting contract,
- transaction stays within allowed gas limits.

Institutional ETH holder / DAT / ETF-like actor

A regulated or semi-regulated institution holds ETH directly or through a product. This includes ETH treasury companies, digital asset treasury firms, funds, custodians, and ETF-like structures.

Ethereum is a neutral global settlement and asset layer. For institutions, censorship resistance means settlement assurance and protection from single-jurisdiction capture.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer Managed corporate laptops
OS Windows or macOS
Network Corporate VPN, private networks, cloud VPC
Wallet Custodian, MPC, HSM, multisig
RPC/node Institutional node provider, private nodes
Frontend Custody dashboard, staking dashboard
Data Accounting systems, compliance tools, indexers
Recovery Legal custody process, operational controls

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Independently verify holdings, staking, and settlement
Write Move funds under strict policy
Prove Prove reserves, custody, or accounting status
Delegate Delegate custody/staking within enforceable limits
Exit Change custodian, staking provider, RPC, node provider, or execution path

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 4
Open source 4
Privacy 4
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Custodian remains solvent and honest.
  • Node provider gives correct state.
  • Staking provider does not centralize risk.
  • Transaction path is not censored.
  • Treasury moves are not leaked before execution.
  • Dashboards and accounting tools are correct.
  • Institution can switch custody, staking, RPC, dashboard, and accounting providers.
  • Private transaction paths are available for sensitive treasury operations.

Access Layer failure

The institution holds ETH but cannot independently verify, transact, stake, or exit because operations depend on one custodian, one node provider, one dashboard, or one jurisdiction.

Access Layer asks

  • Private transactions.
  • Proof-of-reserves tooling.
  • Signed operational frontends.
  • Multi-node verification.
  • Custodian and staking-provider exit standards.
  • Audit-ready access receipts.

Bank / regulated financial institution

A bank wants tokenized deposits, stablecoin settlement, securities settlement, collateral movement, client wallet services, or private institutional flows.

Ethereum can provide neutral programmable settlement. A bank may comply with local regulation while still needing protection from foreign censorship, infrastructure capture, and client-data exposure.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Devices Enterprise-managed laptops and phones
OS Windows/macOS enterprise, iOS
Network Private network, secure datacenters, cloud VPC
Wallet HSM, MPC, policy engine
RPC/node Own nodes, private node providers
Privacy Selective disclosure, ZK proofs, private ledgers
Data Oracles, compliance systems, audit systems
Recovery Institutional controls, dual approval, audit logs

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Verify settlement without leaking client activity
Write Settle without foreign or vendor censorship
Prove Prove compliance without total surveillance
Delegate Assign roles across custody, compliance, treasury
Exit Switch vendors, privacy systems, custodians, and networks

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 5
Open source 4
Privacy 5
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Client flows are not publicly exposed.
  • Compliance tools do not become surveillance defaults.
  • Oracles/data feeds are correct.
  • Private systems interoperate.
  • Vendors cannot lock the bank in.
  • Settlement cannot be blocked by one jurisdiction.
  • Selective disclosure can satisfy compliance without making all user activity public.

Access Layer failure

The bank wants Ethereum settlement but are concerned about using it for client-facing flows because privacy is inadequate.

Access Layer asks

  • Institutional privacy libraries.
  • Private read/write paths.
  • Auditable account delegation.
  • Oracle/data integrity guarantees.
  • Selective-disclosure compliance patterns.
  • Vendor exit standards.

Dapp developer

A developer builds Ethereum applications, wallets, SDKs, frontends, DeFi protocols, DAO tools, games, identity systems, non-financial systems, or public-goods infrastructure.

Ethereum gives developers a shared open execution environment, composable contracts, public standards, and neutral settlement.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer MacBook Pro, Linux workstation
OS macOS, Ubuntu, Arch Linux
Browser Brave, Chrome, Firefox
Wallets MetaMask, Rabby
Dev tools Foundry, Hardhat
RPC Local Anvil, commercial RPCs, self-hosted nodes
Data Subgraphs, custom indexers, explorer APIs
Frontend Vercel, IPFS/static hosting, CDN
Metadata Token lists, NFT metadata, chain config
AI Coding assistants, code generation tools
Sponsorship Bundlers, paymasters, relayers

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Reliable raw and indexed data
Write Safe deployment and interaction flows
Prove Integrate credentials, ZK proofs, attestations
Delegate Use account abstraction, session keys, agent permissions
Exit Avoid vendor lock-in across RPC, wallet SDK, frontend, indexer

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 4
Open source 5
Privacy 4
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • SDKs are safe.
  • Frontend cannot be silently modified.
  • Indexer data is correct.
  • Chain config is authentic.
  • Token metadata is authentic.
  • Simulation results are correct.
  • AI-generated code is safe.
  • Bundler/paymaster behavior is not censoring users.
  • Non-financial participants can read/verify without wallet extensions or ETH.
  • Gas sponsorship is rule-based, not discretionary.

Access Layer failure

The dapp is non-custodial at the contract layer but centralized at the frontend, RPC, indexer, metadata, and transaction construction layers.

For non-financial applications, the operator may be sophisticated, but participants may be one-time users with no wallet, no ETH, no node, and no ability to verify the chain unless the dapp provides a proof-carrying access path.

Access Layer asks

  • CROPS-native developer "package".
    • Private-read libraries.
    • Verified RPC support.
    • Verifiable indexer integrations.
    • Signed frontend templates.
    • Reproducible frontend builds.
    • Clear-signing schemas.
  • Onchain chain config registries.
  • Token metadata verification.
  • Local-first fallback mode.
  • Proof-carrying UI templates.
  • Non-discretionary gas sponsorship patterns.
  • AI-generated-code safety requirements.

On-chain trader / DeFi power user

A user trades assets, provides liquidity, borrows, lends, manages collateral, uses perps, bridges assets, and optimizes execution.

Ethereum gives this user open global financial markets without needing a broker, bank, or centralized exchange.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer High-end desktop or laptop
OS Windows, macOS, Linux
Network Fiber ISP, mobile backup, VPN sometimes
Browser Chrome, Brave, Firefox
Wallet Rabby, MetaMask, hardware wallet, Safe
RPC Enterprise RPC, private RPC, MEV-protected route
Data Indexers, portfolio trackers, price APIs
Execution Aggregators, solvers, intents, private mempool
Frontend DeFi apps, bridge UIs, analytics dashboards

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Monitor positions, prices, collateral, liquidation risk
Write Execute quickly and privately
Prove Prove collateral or eligibility
Delegate Use bots, limit orders, agents, session keys
Exit Withdraw, bridge, revoke approvals, close positions

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 4
Open source 3
Privacy 5
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Frontend constructs the right transaction.
  • Simulation API is correct.
  • Oracle is correct.
  • Indexer is fresh.
  • Private relay does not censor.
  • Solver is honest or replaceable.
  • RPC does not leak strategy.
  • Transaction is not reordered or sandwiched.
  • Bridge/L2 exit path is usable during market stress.
  • Approval and delegation state is visible and revocable.

Access Layer failure

The trader loses funds because the frontend, simulation, oracle, solver, indexer, bridge, or transaction path fails, not because the core protocol failed.

Access Layer asks

  • Private execution paths.
  • Verifiable simulations through Transaction Assertions.
  • Oracle risk labeling.
  • Bridge/solver risk receipts.
  • Approval and delegation dashboards.
  • Multi-RPC fallback.

Unbanked / underbanked user

A person cannot easily access banking due to geography, documentation, migration status, discrimination, poverty, currency instability, or weak financial infrastructure.

Ethereum can provide stable money, remittances, online income, and payment access without a bank account.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer Often none
Mobile Low/mid-range Android
OS Android
Network Prepaid mobile data, unstable Wi-Fi
Browser Chrome mobile or in-app browser
Wallet Mobile wallet, embedded wallet, exchange wallet
RPC Wallet default
Assets Stablecoins, small ETH/gas balance
Recovery Screenshots, cloud backups, trusted friend
Off-ramp P2P, local agent, exchange, merchant

Core verbs

Verb Requirement
Read Check balances cheaply and privately
Write Send and receive low-cost payments
Prove Prove payment, work, eligibility, or reputation
Delegate Let trusted helpers assist without custody
Exit Recover account and move funds if provider fails

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 5
Open source 3
Privacy 4
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Stablecoin is real.
  • Token metadata is authentic.
  • Chain config is safe.
  • Wallet provider remains available.
  • Recovery does not expose the account.
  • Public balance does not create robbery/extortion risk.
  • Off-ramp remains available.
  • Gas sponsorship or fee abstraction does not become a new censoring intermediary.

Access Layer failure

The user is pushed into custodial apps because self-custody is too hard, recovery is unsafe, gas is confusing, and metadata is spoofable.

Access Layer asks

  • Low-resource wallet profile.
  • Recoverable self-custody.
  • Private balance display.
  • Stablecoin-native UX.
  • Verified token lists.
  • Safer gas sponsorship.
  • Local-language warnings.

Small merchant in unstable economy

A small business owner in a high-inflation, capital-controlled, or banking-constrained economy accepts stablecoins, pays suppliers, and preserves working capital.

Ethereum gives the merchant access to global payments and stable assets when local banking is unreliable or politically controlled.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer Basic Windows laptop or Android tablet
Mobile Android phone
Network Local ISP, mobile data
Browser Chrome
Wallet Mobile stablecoin wallet, exchange wallet
Metadata Token lists, price APIs
Accounting Spreadsheet, local POS, export tool
Employees Shared access, role-based payment handling

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Confirm settlement and balances
Write Pay suppliers and employees
Prove Produce invoices, receipts, tax/accounting records
Delegate Let employees receive payments with limits
Exit Move funds if wallet, exchange, or government blocks access

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 5
Open source 3
Privacy 4
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • QR code is correct.
  • Token is authentic.
  • Price feed is correct.
  • Employee access is limited.
  • Public wallet does not reveal revenue.
  • Off-ramp is available.
  • Accounting exports do not leak sensitive business information.
  • Receive addresses can rotate without confusing customers.

Access Layer failure

A public address exposes revenue, customers, suppliers and payroll to criminals or competitors

Access Layer asks

  • Merchant-safe wallet.
  • Rotating receive addresses.
  • Verified payment requests.
  • Employee spending limits.
  • Private invoice metadata.
  • QR substitution protection.

Global freelancer

A global worker gets paid by DAOs, open-source projects, crypto startups, or online communities. They use wallets for income, reputation, governance, and identity.

Ethereum enables global work, direct payment, public reputation, token governance, and coordination without employer <> bank dependence.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer MacBook or Linux laptop
OS macOS, Ubuntu
Network Home ISP, coworking Wi-Fi, VPN
Browser Chrome, Brave
Wallet MetaMask, Rabby, Safe, hardware wallet
Identity ENS, GitHub, Discord, Farcaster, attestations
Payroll DAO tools, Safe, streams, grants
Data DAO dashboards, governance indexers

Core verbs

Verb Requirement
Read Track income, votes, claims, vesting, reputation
Write Vote, claim, transfer, swap, bridge
Prove Prove work, credentials, eligibility
Delegate Delegate votes or payment authority
Exit Leave DAO, revoke permissions, move identity/reputation

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 4
Open source 5
Privacy 4
Security 4

Hidden trust assumptions

  • DAO frontend is safe.
  • Payroll data does not expose personal finances.
  • ENS identity does not link all activity.
  • Governance indexer is correct.
  • Delegate permissions do not persist unnoticed.
  • Tax tools do not get excessive wallet access.
  • Reputation and contribution records are portable if the DAO or platform fails.
  • Voting or eligibility proofs do not over-reveal identity.

Access Layer failure

One public wallet becomes a full dossier: income, votes, grants, politics, donations, spending, savings, and social graph.

Access Layer asks

  • Private payroll.
  • Portable identity and contribution records.
  • Selective reputation proofs.
  • Delegation dashboards.
  • Governance privacy.

Humanitarian aid operator

An aid organization distributes money, vouchers, or goods in a conflict zone, refugee context, disaster zone, or area with broken banking infrastructure.

Ethereum can support direct aid distribution, reduce intermediary leakage, and provide verifiable donor reporting.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer Managed NGO laptops
Mobile Android devices for field teams
Network Mobile networks, starlink, VPN
Wallet Smart accounts, voucher wallets, custodial-lite wallets
Identity Minimal identity, selective disclosure
RPC Managed RPC with fallback
Frontend Aid dashboard, merchant redemption app
Assets Stablecoins, vouchers, tokenized aid credits

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Verify aid delivery without exposing recipients
Write Send aid despite banking failure
Prove Prove eligibility and delivery privately
Delegate Let field workers distribute within limits
Exit Continue if vendor, government, or network blocks access

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 5
Open source 4
Privacy 5
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Recipient wallets are not public target lists.
  • Eligibility proofs do not expose identity.
  • Field devices are secure.
  • Merchant redemption does not leak recipient location.
  • Aid frontend remains available.
  • Gas sponsorship cannot selectively exclude eligible recipients.
  • Recipients can recover access despite lost phones, displacement, or shared devices.

Access Layer failure

A transparent aid system becomes a public map of vulnerable recipients.

Access Layer asks

  • Privacy-preserving aid distribution.
  • Plausible deniability.
  • Selective-disclosure eligibility.
  • Shared-device-safe wallets.
  • Non-discretionary sponsorship for eligible recipients.
  • Low-bandwidth modes.

Home validator / solo staker

Scenario

A technically capable user runs Ethereum validators from home to support decentralization and earn staking rewards.

Ethereum allows individuals to participate directly in consensus instead of relying only on professional staking providers.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Hardware NUC, mini-PC, server
OS Ubuntu, Arch Linux
Network Residential fiber, UPS, 4G/5G backup
Clients Execution client + consensus client
Wallet Cold withdrawal keys, validator signing keys
Monitoring Grafana, Prometheus, alerts
Security Firewall, SSH hardening, backups

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Independently verify chain state
Write Attest and propose blocks
Prove Prove validator performance and rewards
Delegate Optionally delegate staking without losing sovereignty
Exit Exit validator, rotate keys, switch clients

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 5
Open source 5
Privacy 3
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Client implementation is correct.
  • Relay/builder path does not censor.
  • Monitoring stack is accurate.
  • Home network remains available.
  • Validator keys are protected.
  • Slashing protections are correct.
  • The operator can switch clients, relays, and infrastructure without losing safety.

Access Layer failure

Validation centralizes because solo staking is too operationally complex, too risky, or too dependent on professional/cloud infrastructure.

Access Layer asks

  • Easier home-staking setup.
  • Better validator key management.
  • Home-validator privacy improvements.
  • Client-switching tools.
  • Relay risk indicators.

Corporate treasury / web3 startup

Scenario

A crypto-native company manages runway, payroll, grants, vendors, protocol revenue, token treasury, governance, and liquidity.

Ethereum enables global corporate finance, programmable treasury control, transparent governance, and direct settlement.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Computer Managed MacBooks
OS macOS, Windows
Network Office/home ISP, VPN
Browser Brave, Chrome, Firefox
Wallet Safe multisig, hardware wallets
RPC Default RPC
Frontend Safe, treasury dashboard, DAO tools
Data Accounting, indexers, approval dashboards
Controls Signer roles, spending limits, simulations

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read Monitor balances, approvals, payroll, liabilities
Write Pay employees/vendors and execute governance
Prove Prove solvency, vesting, payments, audit status
Delegate Assign roles to finance, founders, legal, agents
Exit Rotate signers, revoke permissions, replace vendors/frontends

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 4
Open source 4
Privacy 4
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • Safe frontend is authentic.
  • Transaction builder is safe.
  • Simulation API is correct.
  • Signers understand what they sign.
  • Transactions does not leak sensitive information.
  • Payroll, runway, vendors, and strategy are not exposed by default.
  • Signer and approval state is visible and revocable.
  • The company can operate through alternate frontends if the main UI is compromised.

Access Layer failure

A compromised frontend, bad approval, signer mistake, or false simulation drains the treasury.

Access Layer asks

  • Verifiable treasury frontends.
  • Clear-signing for multisigs.
  • Policy-based multisig.
  • Privacy.
  • Local transaction simulation.
  • Approval and delegation dashboards.
  • Payroll privacy.

AI-delegating user

Scenario

A user lets an AI assistant help with Ethereum actions: paying invoices, rebalancing assets, claiming rewards, bridging, voting, checking risk, handling transactions, or any other on-chain activity.

Ethereum can allow agents to act under enforceable user-owned rules rather than platform-controlled accounts.

Access stack

Layer Likely setup
Device Laptop or mobile
OS macOS, Windows, iOS, Android
AI External model, local model
Wallet Wallet policy engine, smart account, passkey wallet, hardware approval for high-risk actions
Delegation Spending limits, time limits, contract limits, session keys
RPC Agent-selected unless constrained by CROPS policy
Recovery Human override, revocation, emergency lock

Cores

Verb Requirement
Read AI can inspect state without over-leaking data
Write AI can act only within explicit limits
Prove AI can help create proofs without unnecessary disclosure
Delegate User grants narrow, revocable authority
Exit User can revoke AI and recover direct control

CROPS dependency

Property Importance
Censorship resistance 4
Open source 4
Privacy 5
Security 5

Hidden trust assumptions

  • AI does not become custodian.
  • AI does not leak wallet state to model providers.
  • Agent cannot exceed permissions.
  • Agent cannot be prompt-injected into malicious actions.
  • User understands what authority was delegated.
  • The wallet, not the LLM, is the authority.
  • Revocation works immediately.
  • AI routing does not silently default to centralized or censoring infrastructure.

Access Layer failure

AI makes Ethereum easier to use but silently centralizes decision-making, routing, privacy, and custody to centralized LLM providers.

Access Layer asks

  • SKILLS.md files with CROPS guides for agents.
  • Local/open model options.
  • Human approval thresholds.
  • Prompt-injection-resistant transaction flows.
  • Wallet-native policy engine.
  • Agent permission receipts.
  • Revocation dashboard.
  • Agent audit logs.

Contributors

0xFredrik

Issues