A walkie-talkie for your Claude fleet. Hands-free steering of a local multi-agent system: ask what's going on, unblock agents, spawn workers, from your phone or by voice, while the fleet itself runs entirely on your own machine.

Three layers:

1. Fleet: walkie's own native backend runs single-task Claude Agent SDK workers, each in its own git worktree, following the target repo's conventions and gated by a capability guard (see Fleet safety). No daemon, no autonomous supervisor, no merge-queue: the walkie server is the only coordinator and acts only on your explicit requests.
2. Resident orchestrator: a persistent Claude Agent SDK session on this machine that inspects the fleet (status, logs, PRs) under a strict command allowlist and answers in short, voice-friendly prose. Summarization happens here, so remote clients only ever receive small digests.
3. MCP surface: streamable HTTP MCP with bearer auth (or Google Workspace SSO), so any remote client (claude.ai custom connector, OpenAI Realtime voice session, another Claude Code) can pilot the fleet.

bun install
export FLEET_TOKEN="$(openssl rand -hex 24)"   # keep it somewhere safe
bun start                                       # listens on 127.0.0.1:8787

Env:

• FLEET_TOKEN (required): bearer token for every MCP request.
• FLEET_CONTROL=off: hide the write tools (spawn_worker, send_to_agent) for a read-only surface.
• WALKIE_DENY / WALKIE_ALLOW (optional): JSON glob arrays for the command policy (see Fleet safety).
• PORT (default 8787).

Read lane (deterministic): fleet_status (each worker's status), agent_output (a worker's live terminal), task_history, search_memory (past runs), suggest_agent (which agent/model to use for a task). Brain: ask_orchestrator (preferred for open questions; summaries happen Mac-side). Control lane: spawn_worker, send_to_agent (message a running worker), record_run (save a retrospective to memory), reset_orchestrator.

list_sessions lists recent Claude and Codex CLI sessions on this machine; convert_session reads one (by id or path) and writes a portable handoff transcript for a target agent (claude/codex/opencode) with tool calls translated to the target's vocabulary (Claude Bash ⇄ Codex exec/exec_command ⇄ opencode bash, etc.). Reimplemented in TS from continuo (Swift): per-provider adapters → a canonical session model → a tool taxonomy → renderer. Provider-private reasoning is dropped (not portable). Writing a native auto-resume file for the target is a separate, live-validated step; today it emits a markdown handoff to continue from. opencode read/write is pending (its on-disk layout is version-unstable; the plan is its export/import commands).

Each run can be recorded to ~/.fleet-orchestrator/memory/<repo>/runs/*.json via record_run (worker metadata is auto-filled; you add outcome + a right/wrong/improve retrospective and any harness suggestion). search_memory recalls what worked; suggest_agent recommends an agent+model for a task, preferring what the repo's memory shows worked, and otherwise a seed heuristic: claude by default (runs on your subscription, no marginal cost), opencode + Kimi K3 for long-horizon terminal/agentic and systems work (worth the API cost), claude for web/UI/dataviz and multi-language breadth. Suggestions are advisory; you decide.

Each worker is an interactive agent CLI in its own tmux session (walkie-<name>) and git worktree. Consequences:

• Joinable locally: tmux attach -t walkie-<name> to watch or take over.
• Remote-controllable (claude only): set WALKIE_REMOTE_CONTROL=on and claude workers launch with --remote-control, so you can steer from the Claude mobile app / claude.ai/code.
• fleet_status reports each worker's live status (working / idle / blocked:trust / ended) from its tmux pane; send_to_agent types into the live session.

spawn_worker takes agent ∈ claude | opencode | codex (default claude) and an optional model (for opencode as provider/model, e.g. moonshot/kimi-k3, zhipu/glm-5.2, anthropic/…, openai/…; opencode needs the provider's API key in the server env). All three run gated by the shared capability guard (src/gitguard.ts), but the enforcement mechanism differs per CLI:

codex has no per-command hook, so its shim is bypassable (/usr/bin/git …); for shared repos pair it with the credential backstop (see Fleet safety). Claude workers run on your subscription; opencode/codex bill their provider API key.

A self-contained web page at /voice for hands-free sessions over the OpenAI Realtime API (default model gpt-realtime-2.1-mini, override with WALKIE_REALTIME_MODEL; voice via WALKIE_REALTIME_VOICE). Requires OPENAI_API_KEY on the walkie server.

open http://127.0.0.1:8787/voice   # paste the fleet token, tap Connect, talk

How it works: the server mints a short-lived Realtime client secret (your OpenAI key never reaches the browser); the page opens a WebRTC audio session, pulls walkie's tool list from the local MCP endpoint, and registers every tool as a Realtime function tool. Tool calls are executed by the browser against the same origin, so the fleet token and fleet data never transit through OpenAI's tool plumbing (only what enters the conversation does), and no public tunnel is needed for local use. Control-lane tools (spawn_worker, send_to_agent, reset_orchestrator) pop a tap-to-approve dialog before executing.

The web client dies when a phone locks (iOS suspends the tab and the microphone). mobile/ is an Expo app with the same architecture (on-device MCP bridge, ephemeral Realtime secrets, tap-to-approve) plus what a locked phone needs: react-native-webrtc and iOS UIBackgroundModes: [audio, voip], so the session keeps running in a pocket, like a call. Uses native modules, so it runs as a custom dev client, not Expo Go.

cd mobile && bun install
bunx eas login                                   # Expo account
bunx eas device:create                           # register your iPhone (ad hoc)
bunx eas build --profile internal --platform ios # then install from the build link

Two build profiles (mobile/eas.json):

• development — dev client + Metro, for iterating (needs your Mac on the same network).
• internal — standalone release build: JS bundled, no Metro, no local network. Installs from a link on registered devices, no TestFlight. This is the one to use day-to-day.

bunx eas build --profile internal --platform ios   # then open the build link on the iPhone

Requires an Apple Developer Program membership for the certificates. The default server URL is baked in from app.json → extra.walkieServerUrl (see below), so the app connects with no typing; in AUTH_MODE=google you sign in once via <url>/auth/login on the phone and paste the 7-day token. If iOS ever suspends the session mid-pocket, the planned hardening is CallKit via react-native-callkeep so walkie sessions present as real calls.

The app also targets the web: WebRTC goes through a platform adapter (src/rtc.ts native, src/rtc.web.ts browser). Two ways to run it:

cd mobile && bun run web          # dev: Expo serves it, CORS on the server allows the origin
bun run --cwd mobile export:web   # prod: builds mobile/dist, served by walkie at /app

The /app route on the walkie server serves the exported build same-origin, so the desktop browser client and the phone app are the same codebase. public/voice.html remains as a zero-build fallback.

The server binds 127.0.0.1:8787 by default. To reach it from your phone off-wifi, expose it over a public HTTPS URL. Four methods, pick by what you have:

With any tunnel, keep HOST=127.0.0.1 (the tunnel connects to localhost, so the Mac is never exposed on the LAN). The mobile app's default URL lives in mobile/app.json → extra.walkieServerUrl; other clients (claude.ai connector at https://<host>/mcp, an OpenAI Realtime voice session's {type:"mcp", server_url, authorization}) just take the URL.

TS=/Applications/Tailscale.app/Contents/MacOS/tailscale
# 1. Log in (macOS GUI build: use the menu-bar app; the CLI login can be flaky)
$TS login
# 2. Enable Funnel for this node — one-time browser consent. Running the serve command
#    below prints the exact enable URL (https://login.tailscale.com/f/funnel?node=...).
# 3. Serve localhost:8787 publicly and persistently (survives reboot)
$TS funnel --bg 8787
$TS funnel status          # confirm; prints https://<machine>.<tailnet>.ts.net

Tailscale terminates TLS and proxies the public https://<machine>.<tailnet>.ts.net to localhost:8787. Turn it off with $TS funnel --https=443 off (or $TS serve reset).

# Named (stable) — needs a domain on your Cloudflare account:
cloudflared tunnel login
cloudflared tunnel create walkie
cloudflared tunnel route dns walkie walkie.example.com
cloudflared tunnel run --url http://localhost:8787 walkie   # persist via a launchd service

# Quick (throwaway, random URL that changes each run) — no login, no domain:
cloudflared tunnel --url http://localhost:8787

For a Cloud Run deployment (public by default, but gateway-only — no fleet), see DEPLOY.md.

Two modes, set by AUTH_MODE (see .env.example):

• token (default): one shared bearer, FLEET_TOKEN (generate with openssl rand -hex 24). Zero setup; every request needs Authorization: Bearer <token>. Good for personal/solo use.
• google: Google Workspace SSO restricted to a domain (GOOGLE_ALLOWED_DOMAIN, default juisci.com). A signed 7-day session (HS256) is issued as an httpOnly cookie (web, same-origin) or handed to the mobile app via a walkie:// deep link (one-tap sign-in). FLEET_TOKEN, if also set, still works as a bearer for machine clients (CI, connectors).

Needed only for AUTH_MODE=google. In the Google Cloud Console → APIs & Services → Credentials → Create credentials → OAuth client ID:

1. Application type: Web application.
2. Authorized redirect URIs — add one <PUBLIC_URL>/auth/callback per environment you use:
   • local via tunnel: https://<machine>.<tailnet>.ts.net/auth/callback
   • Cloud Run: https://<your-domain>/auth/callback You do not register the mobile walkie:// scheme with Google, the callback redirects to it server-side after Google is done, so Google only ever sees the HTTPS callback.
3. Copy the client ID and client secret into the server env:

# .env (local)
AUTH_MODE=google
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID=...apps.googleusercontent.com
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET=GOCSPX-...
GOOGLE_ALLOWED_DOMAIN=juisci.com
SESSION_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)   # signs the 7-day sessions
PUBLIC_URL=https://<machine>.<tailnet>.ts.net   # must exactly match the redirect URI host

For Cloud Run these go in Secret Manager instead, see DEPLOY.md. Sign-in flow: browser → <PUBLIC_URL>/auth/login sets the cookie; mobile → the app's "Sign in with Google" button calls /auth/login?client=app and receives the session over walkie://auth.

walkie is built for pointing agents at repos you care about, including shared ones, so its default is caution. Where multiclaude optimizes for autonomous velocity (a supervisor that finds work and dispatches agents, a merge-queue that merges green PRs on its own, workers in bypass-permissions mode), walkie inverts every one of those defaults. Its workers run --permission-mode dontAsk (never bypass) and are gated by a PreToolUse hook rather than trusting the agent:

Safety is per-command, not per-repo (any repo you name is fine, including shared ones). Three layers, all in src/gitguard.ts and enforced identically across claude/opencode/codex:

1. Per-worker capabilities, off by default, granted only when you explicitly ask, and enabling any requires your verbatim consent phrase (I give explicit consent to remove this) on spawn_worker: allowMainPush, allowMerge (gh pr merge), allowForcePush.
2. Configurable command policy (WALKIE_DENY / WALKIE_ALLOW, JSON glob arrays) blocks arbitrary commands for all workers, with safe defaults (deploy/publish/secret actions like gh workflow run, gh release create, npm publish). Add your own (kubectl *, …) or carve exceptions via WALKIE_ALLOW.
3. Always-hard rules: --no-verify (skips the repo's checks) and remote retargeting are never allowed; shell chaining (;, &&, |) is rejected so nothing smuggles past.

So "fix X and merge to main" works when you say so; an agent deploying to prod or merging unprompted cannot. The gate is command-parsing (strong, not cryptographic), and it's a hard intercept for claude (PreToolUse hook) and opencode (plugin) but a bypassable PATH-shim for codex. For a hard guarantee on shared repos, run the fleet under a bot identity whose token cannot merge and can only push allowed refs, plus branch protection. See DEPLOY.md.

• Server binds to localhost only; the tunnel is the sole remote path.
• Bearer token required on every request (min 24 chars enforced).
• The orchestrator agent runs under a command allowlist (see ALLOWED_COMMANDS in src/orchestrator.ts): fleet inspection and steering only, no merges/pushes/edits, and chained shell commands are rejected. Widen it consciously.
• The MCP surface is remote code execution by intent. Treat FLEET_TOKEN like an SSH key.

bun test            # unit tests (sanitization, command allowlist)
bun run typecheck   # tsc, strict
bun run lint        # biome check
bun run lint:fix    # biome check --write

CI (GitHub Actions) runs Biome, tsc, and the tests on every push and PR.

Design informed by prior art: multiclaude (the original wrapped backend, since replaced by the native one) and the tmux delivery protocol adapted from gastown (MIT); blocked-prompt detection concept from claude-squad (AGPL: concept only, no code); structured-log ideas from vibe-kanban (Apache-2.0).