Hit hot key or select command from Alfred window to extract.
[12:36:18.989] Logging Started...
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[12:36:40.485] PDF Annotation Extractor[List Filter] Passing output 'run' to Conditional
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[12:36:43.986] PDF Annotation Extractor[File Filter] Passing output '/Users/michaelbaldwin/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-Personal/Zotero/manata2011FreeWillMoral.pdf' to Arg and Vars
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[12:36:43.992] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Passing output '/Users/michaelbaldwin/Library/CloudStorage/OneDrive-Personal/Zotero/manata2011FreeWillMoral.pdf' to Replace
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[12:36:44.379] PDF Annotation Extractor[Run Script] Passing output '79;;Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology;;;;Manata, Paul;;2011;;article;;
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[12:36:44.382] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Passing output '79;;Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology;;;;Manata, Paul;;2011;;article;;
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[12:36:45.512] PDF Annotation Extractor[Run Script] Passing output '[{"annotatedText":"men’s�actions�may�be�free�(because�done�spontaneously�and�by a�previous�judgment�of�reason),�they�do�not�cease�to�be�necessary�with respect�to�the�divine�decree�and�foreknowledge.�Now�the�foreknowledge of�God�implies�indeed�the�infallibility�of�futurition�and�of�the�event�and�the necessity�of�consequence,�and�yet�does�not�imply�coaction�or�violence,�nor take�away�from�the�will�its�intrinsic�liberty.","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","comment":"An action being ‘done spontaneously \u0026 by a previous judgment of reason’ is what makes it free, despite it also being necessary w.r.t. God’s plan or intentions.","date":"2022-09-06T13:22:33Z","id":"highlight-p24x126y405","page":24,"pageLabel":"24","type":"highlight","x":126.57,"y":405.14},{"annotatedText":"�the�ground�of�God’s�foreknowledge�is�God’s�decree�according to�the�counsel�of�his�will.�The�truths�about�all�that�happens�in�time�are�ultimately grounded�in�God,�not�in�the�creature.�","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","comment":"Classical theism, though? 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' to Conditional
[12:36:45.520] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Processing complete
[12:36:45.522] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Passing output '[{"annotatedText":"men’s�actions�may�be�free�(because�done�spontaneously�and�by a�previous�judgment�of�reason),�they�do�not�cease�to�be�necessary�with respect�to�the�divine�decree�and�foreknowledge.�Now�the�foreknowledge of�God�implies�indeed�the�infallibility�of�futurition�and�of�the�event�and�the necessity�of�consequence,�and�yet�does�not�imply�coaction�or�violence,�nor take�away�from�the�will�its�intrinsic�liberty.","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","comment":"An action being ‘done spontaneously \u0026 by a previous judgment of reason’ is what makes it free, despite it also being necessary w.r.t. God’s plan or intentions.","date":"2022-09-06T13:22:33Z","id":"highlight-p24x126y405","page":24,"pageLabel":"24","type":"highlight","x":126.57,"y":405.14},{"annotatedText":"�the�ground�of�God’s�foreknowledge�is�God’s�decree�according to�the�counsel�of�his�will.�The�truths�about�all�that�happens�in�time�are�ultimately grounded�in�God,�not�in�the�creature.�","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","comment":"Classical theism, though? Doesn’t the doctrine of mixed relations teach that all contingency is ultimately grounded in something other than God?","date":"2022-09-06T13:39:30Z","id":"highlight-p25x90y489","page":25,"pageLabel":"25","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":489.38},{"annotatedText":"in�answer�to�the�“could�you�do�otherwise”�question,�classical compatibilism�says�you�could�do�otherwise�in�this�sense:�if�you�had�wanted�to�do otherwise,�then�you�would�have.�The�point�here�is�that�“can”�in�the�question�“can you�do�otherwise”�is�ambiguous.�Thus,�as�long�as�“freedom�to�do�otherwise”�is given�this�hypothetical�gloss,�classical�compatibilism�allows�for�ability�to�do otherwise.","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-07T11:25:40Z","id":"highlight-p35x90y537","page":35,"pageLabel":"35","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":537.14},{"annotatedText":"They�deny�the�hypothetical�analysis�of�‘can’�and�claim�it�is� fraught�with�problems,�and�so�claim�that�freedom�(in�the�sense�of�ability�to�do otherwise)�cannot�be�had�on�determinism.�However,�they�claim�that�moral responsibility�does�not�require�ability�to�do�otherwise.�So�it’s�‘semi-‘ compatibilism:�compatibilism�about�moral�responsibility,�incompatibilism�about ability�to�do�otherwise.","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-07T11:35:08Z","id":"highlight-p39x90y214","page":39,"pageLabel":"39","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":214.58},{"annotatedText":"two�kinds�of�control: regulative�control�and�guidance�control.�The�former�requires�the�ability�to�do otherwise,�the�latter�does�not;�and�it�is�only�the�latter,�they�argue,�that�is required�for�responsibility.","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-07T11:35:39Z","id":"highlight-p41x90y476","page":41,"pageLabel":"41","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":476.42},{"annotatedText":"They�claim�that�the�morally responsible�individual�would�have�to�be�responsive�to�different�reasons�(reasons responsiveness)�if�she�or�he�were�to�have�them.�The�turning�of�the�car�could�not be�done�out�of�compulsion,�something�done�regardless�of�reasons�to�the contrary.�On�top�of�this,�they�argue�that�the�reasoning�mechanism�must�be�the person’s�‘own,’�and�that�he�or�she�would�‘take�responsibility’�or�‘ownership’�of their�actions,�especially�when�they�have�been�informed�of�the�determinism involved.","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-07T11:36:15Z","id":"highlight-p42x90y537","page":42,"pageLabel":"42","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":537.14},{"annotatedText":"d�Frankfurt�libertarians,49�claim�that�the�relevant�factor�required�for�moral responsibility�is�that�the�agent�be�the�ultimate�source�of�her�actions,�whether�or not�they�have�alternative�possibilities�available�to�them.�They�are�libertarians","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-06T14:23:20Z","id":"highlight-p45x90y163","page":45,"pageLabel":"45","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":163.46},{"annotatedText":"because�they�claim�that�ultimate�sourcehood�is�incompatible�with�our�wills�or character�being�determined�by�anything�other�than�us.�This�view�is�also sometimes�known�as�narrow�source�incompatibilism.","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-06T14:23:27Z","id":"highlight-p46x90y656","page":46,"pageLabel":"46","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":656.18},{"annotatedText":"Wide�source�incompatibilism�means�that�moral responsibility�is�incompatible�with�determinism�and�requires�alternative possibilities�at�the�moment�of�character�forming�or�will-setting�to�ensure�ultimate sourcehood.�","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-06T14:24:43Z","id":"highlight-p46x90y203","page":46,"pageLabel":"46","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":203.78},{"annotatedText":"Perhaps�the�idea�that�we�really�can�do�other�than�God�decrees— not�in�any�of�the�compatibilist�or�conditional�senses�above,�but�that�we�could really�do�any�action�we�want�regardless�of�God’s�decree?�That�is:�same�decree,� possible�different�futures.�If�not,�then�compatibilism�must�be�affirmed.�","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-06T14:33:58Z","id":"highlight-p55x90y537","page":55,"pageLabel":"55","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":537.14},{"annotatedText":"What�I�do�is�conditionally�necessary�on God’s�decree,�contingent�on�his�decree.","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-06T15:06:49Z","id":"highlight-p58x90y537","page":58,"pageLabel":"58","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":537.14},{"annotatedText":"�James�Frank,�“Duns�Scotus�on�Autonomous�Freedom�and�Divine�Co-Causality,” in�Medieval�Philosophy�and�Theology.�Vol�2.�Ed.�By�Norman�Kretzmann,�et�al. (University�of�Notre�Dame�Press,�1992","date":"2022-09-06T15:07:21Z","id":"highlight-p58x90y71","page":58,"pageLabel":"58","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":71.65},{"annotatedText":"�Thomas�Williams,�“Human�Nature�and�Free�Will”�forthcoming�in�the�Oxford� Handbook�of�Aquinas�(Oxford�University�Press),�available�online,�\u003c� http://shell.cas.usf.edu/~thomasw/Human%20freedom%20and%20agency%20(A quinas).pdf\u003e,�last�accessed�7/17/11.�","date":"2022-09-06T15:08:13Z","id":"highlight-p59x90y85","page":59,"pageLabel":"59","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":85.57},{"annotatedText":"the�two�main contingency�desiderata�needed�for�Reformed�orthodoxy�(epistemic�contingency and�secondary�causes)�are�completely�consistent�with�determinism.�","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-06T15:08:42Z","id":"highlight-p60x90y654","page":60,"pageLabel":"60","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":654.26},{"annotatedText":"�John�Duns�Scotus,�Contingency�and�Freedom.�Lectura�I,�39,�eds.�A.�Vos�Jaczn.,�H. Veldhuis,�A.�H.�Looman-Graaskamp,�E.�Dekker�and�N.�W.�den�Bok�(Springer�1994)","date":"2022-09-06T15:13:17Z","id":"highlight-p60x90y127","page":60,"pageLabel":"60","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":127.81},{"annotatedText":"necessity�and�freedom�are�neither contraries�nor�contradictories:�the�contrary�of�necessity�is�impossibility;�the contrary�of�freedom�is�coercion.","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-07T07:42:03Z","id":"highlight-p63x90y190","page":63,"pageLabel":"63","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":190.82},{"annotatedText":"if�the contingency�is�only�a�human�epistemic�one,�then�that�fits�with�determinism�and compatibilism.�If�the�contingency�needed�is�that�of�secondary�causality,�that�fits with�determinism�too—so�long�as�the�secondary�cause�cannot�do�otherwise given�the�same�prior�conditions,�and�so�long�as�the�secondary�cause�is�not�the ultimate�source�or�originator�of�its�actions.�If�the�contingency�needed�is�supposed to�be�logical,�that�fits�with�determinism�too�(determinism�simpliciter,�not�logical� determinism).","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-07T07:55:48Z","id":"highlight-p68x90y210","page":68,"pageLabel":"68","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":210.98},{"annotatedText":"how�God could�bring�about�an�inspired�and�inerrant�Bible�if�all�the�writers�wrote�with libertarian�free�will.�","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-07T08:16:46Z","id":"highlight-p70x90y192","page":70,"pageLabel":"70","type":"highlight","x":90.57,"y":192.5},{"annotatedText":"how�God could�bring�about�an�inspired�and�inerrant�Bible�if�all�the�writers�wrote�with libertarian�free�will.�","color":"#ffff7f","colorCategory":"Yellow","date":"2022-09-07T08:16:49Z","id":"strike-p70x90y192","page":70,"pageLabel":"70","type":"strike","x":90.57,"y":192.5}]
' to Run Script
[12:36:46.539] PDF Annotation Extractor[Run Script] Processing complete
[12:36:46.543] PDF Annotation Extractor[Run Script] Passing output '- __An action being ‘done spontaneously & by a previous judgment of reason’ is what makes it free, despite it also being necessary w.r.t. God’s plan or intentions.:__ "men’s�actions�may�be�free�(because�done�spontaneously�and�by a�previous�judgment�of�reason),�they�do�not�cease�to�be�necessary�with respect�to�the�divine�decree�and�foreknowledge.�Now�the�foreknowledge of�God�implies�indeed�the�infallibility�of�futurition�and�of�the�event�and�the necessity�of�consequence,�and�yet�does�not�imply�coaction�or�violence,�nor take�away�from�the�will�its�intrinsic�liberty." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 102]
- __Classical theism, though? Doesn’t the doctrine of mixed relations teach that all contingency is ultimately grounded in something other than God?:__ "�the�ground�of�God’s�foreknowledge�is�God’s�decree�according to�the�counsel�of�his�will.�The�truths�about�all�that�happens�in�time�are�ultimately grounded�in�God,�not�in�the�creature.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 103]
> "in�answer�to�the�“could�you�do�otherwise'�question,�classical compatibilism�says�you�could�do�otherwise�in�this�sense:�if�you�had�wanted�to�do otherwise,�then�you�would�have.�The�point�here�is�that�“can'�in�the�question�“can you�do�otherwise'�is�ambiguous.�Thus,�as�long�as�“freedom�to�do�otherwise'�is given�this�hypothetical�gloss,�classical�compatibilism�allows�for�ability�to�do otherwise." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 113]
> "They�deny�the�hypothetical�analysis�of�‘can’�and�claim�it�is� fraught�with�problems,�and�so�claim�that�freedom�(in�the�sense�of�ability�to�do otherwise)�cannot�be�had�on�determinism.�However,�they�claim�that�moral responsibility�does�not�require�ability�to�do�otherwise.�So�it’s�‘semi-‘ compatibilism:�compatibilism�about�moral�responsibility,�incompatibilism�about ability�to�do�otherwise." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 117]
> "two�kinds�of�control: regulative�control�and�guidance�control.�The�former�requires�the�ability�to�do otherwise,�the�latter�does�not;�and�it�is�only�the�latter,�they�argue,�that�is required�for�responsibility." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 119]
> "They�claim�that�the�morally responsible�individual�would�have�to�be�responsive�to�different�reasons�(reasons responsiveness)�if�she�or�he�were�to�have�them.�The�turning�of�the�car�could�not be�done�out�of�compulsion,�something�done�regardless�of�reasons�to�the contrary.�On�top�of�this,�they�argue�that�the�reasoning�mechanism�must�be�the person’s�‘own,’�and�that�he�or�she�would�‘take�responsibility’�or�‘ownership’�of their�actions,�especially�when�they�have�been�informed�of�the�determinism involved." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 120]
> "d�Frankfurt�libertarians9�claim�that�the�relevant�factor�required�for�moral responsibility�is�that�the�agent�be�the�ultimate�source�of�her�actions,�whether�or not�they�have�alternative�possibilities�available�to�them.�They�are�libertarians" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 123]
> "because�they�claim�that�ultimate�sourcehood�is�incompatible�with�our�wills�or character�being�determined�by�anything�other�than�us.�This�view�is�also sometimes�known�as�narrow�source�incompatibilism." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 124]
> "Wide�source�incompatibilism�means�that�moral responsibility�is�incompatible�with�determinism�and�requires�alternative possibilities�at�the�moment�of�character�forming�or�will-setting�to�ensure�ultimate sourcehood.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 124]
> "Perhaps�the�idea�that�we�really�can�do�other�than�God�decrees— not�in�any�of�the�compatibilist�or�conditional�senses�above,�but�that�we�could really�do�any�action�we�want�regardless�of�God’s�decree?�That�is:�same�decree,� possible�different�futures.�If�not,�then�compatibilism�must�be�affirmed.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 133]
> "What�I�do�is�conditionally�necessary�on God’s�decree,�contingent�on�his�decree." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 136]
> "�James�Frank,�“Duns�Scotus�on�Autonomous�Freedom�and�Divine�Co-Causality,' in�Medieval�Philosophy�and�Theology.�Vol�2.�Ed.�By�Norman�Kretzmann,�et�al. (University�of�Notre�Dame�Press,�1992" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 136]
> "�Thomas�Williams,�“Human�Nature�and�Free�Will'�forthcoming�in�the�Oxford� Handbook�of�Aquinas�(Oxford�University�Press),�available�online,�<� http://shell.cas.usf.edu/~thomasw/Human%20freedom%20and%20agency%20(A quinas).pdf>,�last�accessed�7/17/11.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 137]
> "the�two�main contingency�desiderata�needed�for�Reformed�orthodoxy�(epistemic�contingency and�secondary�causes)�are�completely�consistent�with�determinism.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 138]
> "�John�Duns�Scotus,�Contingency�and�Freedom.�Lectura�I,�39,�eds.�A.�Vos�Jaczn.,�H. Veldhuis,�A.�H.�Looman-Graaskamp,�E.�Dekker�and�N.�W.�den�Bok�(Springer�1994)" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 138]
> "necessity�and�freedom�are�neither contraries�nor�contradictories:�the�contrary�of�necessity�is�impossibility;�the contrary�of�freedom�is�coercion." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 141]
> "if�the contingency�is�only�a�human�epistemic�one,�then�that�fits�with�determinism�and compatibilism.�If�the�contingency�needed�is�that�of�secondary�causality,�that�fits with�determinism�too—so�long�as�the�secondary�cause�cannot�do�otherwise given�the�same�prior�conditions,�and�so�long�as�the�secondary�cause�is�not�the ultimate�source�or�originator�of�its�actions.�If�the�contingency�needed�is�supposed to�be�logical,�that�fits�with�determinism�too�(determinism�simpliciter,�not�logical� determinism)." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 146]
> "how�God could�bring�about�an�inspired�and�inerrant�Bible�if�all�the�writers�wrote�with libertarian�free�will.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 148]
> ~~"how�God could�bring�about�an�inspired�and�inerrant�Bible�if�all�the�writers�wrote�with libertarian�free�will.�"~~ [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 148]
' to Conditional
[12:36:46.552] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Processing complete
[12:36:46.554] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Passing output '- __An action being ‘done spontaneously & by a previous judgment of reason’ is what makes it free, despite it also being necessary w.r.t. God’s plan or intentions.:__ "men’s�actions�may�be�free�(because�done�spontaneously�and�by a�previous�judgment�of�reason),�they�do�not�cease�to�be�necessary�with respect�to�the�divine�decree�and�foreknowledge.�Now�the�foreknowledge of�God�implies�indeed�the�infallibility�of�futurition�and�of�the�event�and�the necessity�of�consequence,�and�yet�does�not�imply�coaction�or�violence,�nor take�away�from�the�will�its�intrinsic�liberty." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 102]
- __Classical theism, though? Doesn’t the doctrine of mixed relations teach that all contingency is ultimately grounded in something other than God?:__ "�the�ground�of�God’s�foreknowledge�is�God’s�decree�according to�the�counsel�of�his�will.�The�truths�about�all�that�happens�in�time�are�ultimately grounded�in�God,�not�in�the�creature.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 103]
> "in�answer�to�the�“could�you�do�otherwise'�question,�classical compatibilism�says�you�could�do�otherwise�in�this�sense:�if�you�had�wanted�to�do otherwise,�then�you�would�have.�The�point�here�is�that�“can'�in�the�question�“can you�do�otherwise'�is�ambiguous.�Thus,�as�long�as�“freedom�to�do�otherwise'�is given�this�hypothetical�gloss,�classical�compatibilism�allows�for�ability�to�do otherwise." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 113]
> "They�deny�the�hypothetical�analysis�of�‘can’�and�claim�it�is� fraught�with�problems,�and�so�claim�that�freedom�(in�the�sense�of�ability�to�do otherwise)�cannot�be�had�on�determinism.�However,�they�claim�that�moral responsibility�does�not�require�ability�to�do�otherwise.�So�it’s�‘semi-‘ compatibilism:�compatibilism�about�moral�responsibility,�incompatibilism�about ability�to�do�otherwise." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 117]
> "two�kinds�of�control: regulative�control�and�guidance�control.�The�former�requires�the�ability�to�do otherwise,�the�latter�does�not;�and�it�is�only�the�latter,�they�argue,�that�is required�for�responsibility." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 119]
> "They�claim�that�the�morally responsible�individual�would�have�to�be�responsive�to�different�reasons�(reasons responsiveness)�if�she�or�he�were�to�have�them.�The�turning�of�the�car�could�not be�done�out�of�compulsion,�something�done�regardless�of�reasons�to�the contrary.�On�top�of�this,�they�argue�that�the�reasoning�mechanism�must�be�the person’s�‘own,’�and�that�he�or�she�would�‘take�responsibility’�or�‘ownership’�of their�actions,�especially�when�they�have�been�informed�of�the�determinism involved." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 120]
> "d�Frankfurt�libertarians9�claim�that�the�relevant�factor�required�for�moral responsibility�is�that�the�agent�be�the�ultimate�source�of�her�actions,�whether�or not�they�have�alternative�possibilities�available�to�them.�They�are�libertarians" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 123]
> "because�they�claim�that�ultimate�sourcehood�is�incompatible�with�our�wills�or character�being�determined�by�anything�other�than�us.�This�view�is�also sometimes�known�as�narrow�source�incompatibilism." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 124]
> "Wide�source�incompatibilism�means�that�moral responsibility�is�incompatible�with�determinism�and�requires�alternative possibilities�at�the�moment�of�character�forming�or�will-setting�to�ensure�ultimate sourcehood.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 124]
> "Perhaps�the�idea�that�we�really�can�do�other�than�God�decrees— not�in�any�of�the�compatibilist�or�conditional�senses�above,�but�that�we�could really�do�any�action�we�want�regardless�of�God’s�decree?�That�is:�same�decree,� possible�different�futures.�If�not,�then�compatibilism�must�be�affirmed.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 133]
> "What�I�do�is�conditionally�necessary�on God’s�decree,�contingent�on�his�decree." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 136]
> "�James�Frank,�“Duns�Scotus�on�Autonomous�Freedom�and�Divine�Co-Causality,' in�Medieval�Philosophy�and�Theology.�Vol�2.�Ed.�By�Norman�Kretzmann,�et�al. (University�of�Notre�Dame�Press,�1992" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 136]
> "�Thomas�Williams,�“Human�Nature�and�Free�Will'�forthcoming�in�the�Oxford� Handbook�of�Aquinas�(Oxford�University�Press),�available�online,�<� http://shell.cas.usf.edu/~thomasw/Human%20freedom%20and%20agency%20(A quinas).pdf>,�last�accessed�7/17/11.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 137]
> "the�two�main contingency�desiderata�needed�for�Reformed�orthodoxy�(epistemic�contingency and�secondary�causes)�are�completely�consistent�with�determinism.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 138]
> "�John�Duns�Scotus,�Contingency�and�Freedom.�Lectura�I,�39,�eds.�A.�Vos�Jaczn.,�H. Veldhuis,�A.�H.�Looman-Graaskamp,�E.�Dekker�and�N.�W.�den�Bok�(Springer�1994)" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 138]
> "necessity�and�freedom�are�neither contraries�nor�contradictories:�the�contrary�of�necessity�is�impossibility;�the contrary�of�freedom�is�coercion." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 141]
> "if�the contingency�is�only�a�human�epistemic�one,�then�that�fits�with�determinism�and compatibilism.�If�the�contingency�needed�is�that�of�secondary�causality,�that�fits with�determinism�too—so�long�as�the�secondary�cause�cannot�do�otherwise given�the�same�prior�conditions,�and�so�long�as�the�secondary�cause�is�not�the ultimate�source�or�originator�of�its�actions.�If�the�contingency�needed�is�supposed to�be�logical,�that�fits�with�determinism�too�(determinism�simpliciter,�not�logical� determinism)." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 146]
> "how�God could�bring�about�an�inspired�and�inerrant�Bible�if�all�the�writers�wrote�with libertarian�free�will.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 148]
> ~~"how�God could�bring�about�an�inspired�and�inerrant�Bible�if�all�the�writers�wrote�with libertarian�free�will.�"~~ [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 148]
' to Conditional
[12:36:46.564] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Processing complete
[12:36:46.565] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Passing output '- __An action being ‘done spontaneously & by a previous judgment of reason’ is what makes it free, despite it also being necessary w.r.t. God’s plan or intentions.:__ "men’s�actions�may�be�free�(because�done�spontaneously�and�by a�previous�judgment�of�reason),�they�do�not�cease�to�be�necessary�with respect�to�the�divine�decree�and�foreknowledge.�Now�the�foreknowledge of�God�implies�indeed�the�infallibility�of�futurition�and�of�the�event�and�the necessity�of�consequence,�and�yet�does�not�imply�coaction�or�violence,�nor take�away�from�the�will�its�intrinsic�liberty." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 102]
- __Classical theism, though? Doesn’t the doctrine of mixed relations teach that all contingency is ultimately grounded in something other than God?:__ "�the�ground�of�God’s�foreknowledge�is�God’s�decree�according to�the�counsel�of�his�will.�The�truths�about�all�that�happens�in�time�are�ultimately grounded�in�God,�not�in�the�creature.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 103]
> "in�answer�to�the�“could�you�do�otherwise'�question,�classical compatibilism�says�you�could�do�otherwise�in�this�sense:�if�you�had�wanted�to�do otherwise,�then�you�would�have.�The�point�here�is�that�“can'�in�the�question�“can you�do�otherwise'�is�ambiguous.�Thus,�as�long�as�“freedom�to�do�otherwise'�is given�this�hypothetical�gloss,�classical�compatibilism�allows�for�ability�to�do otherwise." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 113]
> "They�deny�the�hypothetical�analysis�of�‘can’�and�claim�it�is� fraught�with�problems,�and�so�claim�that�freedom�(in�the�sense�of�ability�to�do otherwise)�cannot�be�had�on�determinism.�However,�they�claim�that�moral responsibility�does�not�require�ability�to�do�otherwise.�So�it’s�‘semi-‘ compatibilism:�compatibilism�about�moral�responsibility,�incompatibilism�about ability�to�do�otherwise." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 117]
> "two�kinds�of�control: regulative�control�and�guidance�control.�The�former�requires�the�ability�to�do otherwise,�the�latter�does�not;�and�it�is�only�the�latter,�they�argue,�that�is required�for�responsibility." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 119]
> "They�claim�that�the�morally responsible�individual�would�have�to�be�responsive�to�different�reasons�(reasons responsiveness)�if�she�or�he�were�to�have�them.�The�turning�of�the�car�could�not be�done�out�of�compulsion,�something�done�regardless�of�reasons�to�the contrary.�On�top�of�this,�they�argue�that�the�reasoning�mechanism�must�be�the person’s�‘own,’�and�that�he�or�she�would�‘take�responsibility’�or�‘ownership’�of their�actions,�especially�when�they�have�been�informed�of�the�determinism involved." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 120]
> "d�Frankfurt�libertarians9�claim�that�the�relevant�factor�required�for�moral responsibility�is�that�the�agent�be�the�ultimate�source�of�her�actions,�whether�or not�they�have�alternative�possibilities�available�to�them.�They�are�libertarians" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 123]
> "because�they�claim�that�ultimate�sourcehood�is�incompatible�with�our�wills�or character�being�determined�by�anything�other�than�us.�This�view�is�also sometimes�known�as�narrow�source�incompatibilism." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 124]
> "Wide�source�incompatibilism�means�that�moral responsibility�is�incompatible�with�determinism�and�requires�alternative possibilities�at�the�moment�of�character�forming�or�will-setting�to�ensure�ultimate sourcehood.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 124]
> "Perhaps�the�idea�that�we�really�can�do�other�than�God�decrees— not�in�any�of�the�compatibilist�or�conditional�senses�above,�but�that�we�could really�do�any�action�we�want�regardless�of�God’s�decree?�That�is:�same�decree,� possible�different�futures.�If�not,�then�compatibilism�must�be�affirmed.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 133]
> "What�I�do�is�conditionally�necessary�on God’s�decree,�contingent�on�his�decree." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 136]
> "�James�Frank,�“Duns�Scotus�on�Autonomous�Freedom�and�Divine�Co-Causality,' in�Medieval�Philosophy�and�Theology.�Vol�2.�Ed.�By�Norman�Kretzmann,�et�al. (University�of�Notre�Dame�Press,�1992" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 136]
> "�Thomas�Williams,�“Human�Nature�and�Free�Will'�forthcoming�in�the�Oxford� Handbook�of�Aquinas�(Oxford�University�Press),�available�online,�<� http://shell.cas.usf.edu/~thomasw/Human%20freedom%20and%20agency%20(A quinas).pdf>,�last�accessed�7/17/11.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 137]
> "the�two�main contingency�desiderata�needed�for�Reformed�orthodoxy�(epistemic�contingency and�secondary�causes)�are�completely�consistent�with�determinism.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 138]
> "�John�Duns�Scotus,�Contingency�and�Freedom.�Lectura�I,�39,�eds.�A.�Vos�Jaczn.,�H. Veldhuis,�A.�H.�Looman-Graaskamp,�E.�Dekker�and�N.�W.�den�Bok�(Springer�1994)" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 138]
> "necessity�and�freedom�are�neither contraries�nor�contradictories:�the�contrary�of�necessity�is�impossibility;�the contrary�of�freedom�is�coercion." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 141]
> "if�the contingency�is�only�a�human�epistemic�one,�then�that�fits�with�determinism�and compatibilism.�If�the�contingency�needed�is�that�of�secondary�causality,�that�fits with�determinism�too—so�long�as�the�secondary�cause�cannot�do�otherwise given�the�same�prior�conditions,�and�so�long�as�the�secondary�cause�is�not�the ultimate�source�or�originator�of�its�actions.�If�the�contingency�needed�is�supposed to�be�logical,�that�fits�with�determinism�too�(determinism�simpliciter,�not�logical� determinism)." [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 146]
> "how�God could�bring�about�an�inspired�and�inerrant�Bible�if�all�the�writers�wrote�with libertarian�free�will.�" [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 148]
> ~~"how�God could�bring�about�an�inspired�and�inerrant�Bible�if�all�the�writers�wrote�with libertarian�free�will.�"~~ [@manata2011FreeWillMoral, p. 148]
' to Write Text File
[12:36:46.574] PDF Annotation Extractor[Write Text File] Processing complete
[12:36:46.590] PDF Annotation Extractor[Write Text File] Passing output '/Users/michaelbaldwin/Library/Mobile Documents/iCloud~md~obsidian/Documents/Zettelkasten/manata2011FreeWillMoral.md' to Run Script
[12:36:47.447] PDF Annotation Extractor[Run Script] Processing complete
[12:36:47.450] PDF Annotation Extractor[Run Script] Passing output '' to Copy to Clipboard
[12:36:47.452] PDF Annotation Extractor[Copy to Clipboard] Processing complete
[12:36:47.455] PDF Annotation Extractor[Copy to Clipboard] Passing output '' to Post Notification
[12:36:47.457] PDF Annotation Extractor[Post Notification] Processing complete
[12:36:47.459] PDF Annotation Extractor[Post Notification] Passing output '' to Play Sound
[12:36:47.462] PDF Annotation Extractor[Play Sound] Processing complete
[12:36:47.465] PDF Annotation Extractor[Play Sound] Passing output '' to Conditional
[12:36:47.510] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Processing complete
[12:36:47.536] PDF Annotation Extractor[Conditional] Passing output '' to Run Script
[12:36:47.538] PDF Annotation Extractor[Play Sound] Passing output '' to Run Script
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