flashbots / pm

Everything there is to know about Flashbots

Flashbots

Flashbots is a research and development organization working on mitigating the negative externalities of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) and avoiding the existential risks MEV could cause to stateful blockchains like Ethereum. Our primary focus is to enable a permissionless, transparent, and sustainable ecosystem for MEV, via a three-pronged approach:

• Illuminate: Bringing transparency to MEV activity.
• Democratize: Democratizing access to MEV revenue.
• Distribute: Enabling sustainable distribution of MEV revenue.

Our efforts are separated into three sub-organizations:

• Product: builds core infrastructure and ecosystem tooling that redefines the block production supply chain. This includes MEV-Boost, SUAVE as well as Flashbots Protect RPC, mev-geth, MEV-Inspect and MEV-Explore.
• Research: an open, transparent, and collaborative research effort that explores MEV market dynamics and blockchain design challenges at the intersection of economics, security, and cryptography. To fuel the collaborative nature of our research, anybody can submit a Flashbots Research Proposal (FRPs) and might become eligible for a grant.
• Coordination: an organizational effort to streamline operational processes, interface with external teams in the ecosystem and scale ourselves to maximize our impact.

Flashbots Research and Product are tightly-coupled dual engines that propel our organization forward in a phased approach:

• Long-term oriented research efforts spec out and update our roadmap, define our organization’s phases and identify key milestones.
• Milestone-oriented engineering efforts ship core infrastructure and ecosystem tools while collecting data and other artifacts that feed back into research.

Our work is open source and you can follow our progress in each respective repository of the Flashbots organization. Anyone is welcome to comment on an issue or pick it up entirely.

Community

The best way to interact with the Flashbots community is through our forum, which is our central communication platform for conversations, announcements and information sharing. We also publish monthly transparency reports that aggregates information and provides summaries on everything Flashbots and MEV.

Join us!

We are not your typical project, we are fully remote and our principles are based on that of a pirate hacker collective. If you are a self-directed individual who puts collective success above your own and is motivated by solving challenging problems with asymmetric impact, you will fit right in.

• Open job positions: Check out the list of full-time roles we're actively recruiting for.
• MEV research fellowship: We issue research grants to Flashbots Research Proposal submitters.
• For anything else, please reach out to us at [email protected]!

Useful links

• 🌐 Website: https://flashbots.net
• 📄 Docs: https://docs.flashbots.net
• 📡 Status: https://status.flashbots.net
• 💬 Discord: https://discord.gg/flashbots
• 💡 Forum: https://collective.flashbots.net
• 📝 Writings: https://writings.flashbots.net
• ⚡ MEV-Boost: https://boost.flashbots.net
• 🗓️ Calendar: https://calendar.flashbots.net
• 🤍 Whitehat: https://whitehat.flashbots.net
• 🛠️ Join us: https://boards.greenhouse.io/flashbots
• 💭 New to MEV?: https://docs.flashbots.net/new-to-mev
• 🎛️ Flashbots Dashboard https://transparency.flashbots.net/
• 🎯 Our Mission: https://writings.flashbots.net/writings/frontrunning-mev-crisis

pm's Issues

Regarding Proof of Stake

With adoption of Proof of stake, flashbots will soon become obsolte and therefore stop to work. Not?

Why ban from Discord?

I got banned from the server,
I was asking for help in identifyng if the smart contract that was shared on twitter was Legit or not!

This is quinn.kin, btw
Pls unban me.

Bundle Pricing Formula documentation broken an incorrect

https://docs.flashbots.net/flashbots-auction/searchers/advanced/bundle-pricing/#bundle-pricing-formula

1. The formula here is not rendering properly. If I copy it to MathJax, it does render properly.
2. The formula references Mt but the legend references Gt so there's inconsistency. Very confusing.

// Your side

//Math Jax

transactions was included as a normal transaction.

It looks like there're some chances that a transaction could be included as a normal transaction sometimes. I guess it might be caused that the transaction was firstly included in a block but the block became uncle block after a reorg. Transactions in the uncle block was put into the pending tx pool and was included later as a normal block.

Any idea to solve this problem?

Ilogical error when calling getConflictingBundle - Error: Target bundle errors at top of block

I am trying to use getConflictingBundle endpoint and always get this error when my txs are 100% sure not reverting, doesn't make any sense .

1. when same tx sent to mainnet without any relevant state changes there are no reverts
2. when simed in tenderly no reverts
3. when siming with flashbots all good.

With getConflictingBundle however, this error happening almost everytime , even for bundles which were included!

What's this all about ? There is nothing on the documentation providing insights into this but seems like some issue with the way flashbots is simulating the transaction ?

how to make sure my bundle submitted to falshbots in top5 transactions within one block, dosent has to be top1 transaction

MEV Roast 15 Agenda - PBS on Ethereum Roadmap

Date: Friday, Dec 3, 2021
Time: 4:30pm UTC / 11:30am ET / 8:30am PT
Roast Master: Hasu

MEV Roast is a candid discussion on MEV research questions with Flashbots, stemming from the tradition of MEV Pi-rate Ship, a neutral, chain-agnostic, interdisciplinary research collective that supports MEV-related theoretical and empirical research. Agenda will be subject to change, the Roast Master will steer the discussion with Roast Questions.

Zoom Link | Subscribe to Flashbots Calendar

Part 0: Proposer/Builder Separation Context (10min)

• Roast Master: Hasu (Slides)

Part 1. Treasure Maps (90min)
Each Roast we will invite MEV Ship research collective members to present insights from MEV-related research they are working on or interesting early stage proposals for community feedback.

• How PBS works and why it is important to Ethereum

  • Navigator: Vitalik (Slides)
    • Resources:
      • Proposer/block builder separation-friendly fee market designs EthResearch post by Vitalik (Jun 4, 2021)
      • Two-slot proposer/builder separation EthResearch post by Vitalik (Oct 10, 2021)
      • Updated Ethereum Roadmap Diagram by Vitalik (Dec 2, 2021)

• PBS Censorship-resistance Schemes: ... and how to make them

  • Navigator: Francesco (Slides)
    • Resources:
      • State of research: increasing censorship resistance of transactions under proposer/builder separation (PBS) Notes by Vitalik and Francesco (Nov 22, 2021)
      • Committee-driven MEV smoothing EthResearch post by Francesco (Aug 13, 2021)

• MEV-boost: The closest we can get to PBS without PBS

  • Navigator: thegostep (Slides)
  • Resources:
    • MEV-Boost: Merge ready Flashbots Architecture EthResearch post by thegostep (Nov 4, 2021)
    • MEV-Boost GitHub Repo
    • Flashbots Eth2 Working Group

Part 2: Round Table (50min)

• What are the current known limitations of PBS design and future research areas?
• What can we do until we have in-protocol PBS?
• How do we optimize in-protocol PBS for fast blocks and protection against network latency?

Extra Credit:

• Research Paper

  • Unity is Strength: A Formalization of Cross-Domain Maximal Extractable Value by Alexandre Obadia, Alejo Salles, Lakshman Sankar, Tarun Chitra, Vaibhav Chellani, Philip Daian (Dec 2, 2021)
  • Clockwork Finance: Automated Analysis of Economic Security in Smart Contracts by Kushal Babel, Philip Daian, Mahimna Kelkar, Ari Juels (Sep 9, 2021)
  • Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges by Philip Daian, Steven Goldfeder, Tyler Kell, Yunqi Li, Xueyuan Zhao, Iddo Bentov, Lorenz Breidenbach, Ari Juels (Apr 10, 2019)

• More Resources:

  • MEV.wtf Unconference (July 1, 2021): agenda | video
  • On the Design of MEV Marketplaces blogpost by Robert Miller (Aug 4, 2021)
  • MEV and EIP 1559 research post by Alejo Salles (Jul 18, 2021)
  • MEV in ETH2 research post by Alex Obadia (Jun 8, 2021)
  • MEV-SGX -- A sealed bid MEV auction design by Robert Miller (May 30, 2021)
  • MEV... wat do? blogpost by Phil Daian (Apr 15, 2021)
  • MEV & Me blogpost by Charlie Noyes (Feb 2, 2021)
  • Flashbots: Frontrunning the MEV Crisis EthResearch post by thegostep (Nov 20, 2020)

Past MEV Roasts recaps | MEV Research Vault | MEV-Explore v0 | Flashbots Transparency Dashboard | Flashbots Writings

---

Interested in joining the Flashbots metaverse and contributing to MEV research?

• Flashbots is hiring! Check out our open positions on Flashbots Job Board.
• Are you a bot operator? Check out the Flashbots MEV job board for opportunities posted by DeFi protocols looking for efficient market.

MEV Roast 13 Agenda - The Blockspace Bazaar: Past, Present and Future

Date: Thursday, Mar 25
Time: 11am ET / 8am PT / 3pm UTC / 11pm China Standard Time
Roast Master: Vitalik @vbuterin

MEV Roast is a monthly tradition from the MEV Pi-rate Ship, a neutral, chain-agnostic, interdisciplinary research collective that supports MEV-related theoretical and empirical research.

Conference Link | Flashbots Calendar | Slides

Part 0: Introduction & Memes (10min)

• MEV 4D Chess in the Blockspace Bazaar: ETH1, L2s & ETH2...
  • Notes from Optimism (WIP): Sequencer MEV Extraction
  • Notes from Arbitrium (WIP): MEV & Arbitrum
  • Notes from Flashbots & Prysmatic Labs: ETH2, MEV & Flashbots

Part 1. Treasure Maps (60min)
Each Roast we will invite MEV Ship research collective members to present insights from MEV-related research they are working on or interesting early stage proposals for community feedback.

Presentation 1: Ethereum block space market structure
- Navigator: Leo Zhang & Georgios Konstantopoulos Slides | Post (20min)
Roast Master (20min):
- Q1: How do you expect a switch to PoS would change the MEV landscape? PoS has predictable block times, proposers can see when they will be able to create blocks, and a proposer can try to create a block multiple times before they propose it. How would MEV extraction have to adapt?
- Q2: How would MEV extraction look like in a world with sharding or rollups, where instead of all transactions passing through a single proposer you have different proposers active in different "domains" at the same time?

Presentation 2: A survey of auction mechanisms for potential MEV auction designs
- Navigator: Surya Bakshi & Alejo Salles Slides (15min)
Presentation 3: A seal-bid MEV auction design: MEV-sgx
- Navigator: Robert Miller & Stephane Gosselin Slides (15min)
Roast Master (20min):
- Q3: Are there alternatives to trusted hardware for ensuring privacy and fairness?

Part 2. Explorations (20min)

• Using flashbots as a backdoor path to account abstraction [Issue #24 ]
• Related EIPs:
  • EIP-2938: Account Abstraction
  • EIP-3074: AUTH and AUTHCALL opcodes

More Resources:
Past MEV Roasts recaps | MEV Research Vault

Goerli test network faucet didn't money now

Goerli test network faucet didn't money now, please send me some, thank you very much, my address is 0 xb8910d898620ef167651f58d914cfb8ad0b930bd

MEV Roast 9 Agenda

MEV Ship Treasure Map Roast VIIII
Date: Wednesday, Dec 16
Time: 1:30pm EST / 10:30am PST / 6:30pm UTC

Flashbots Calendar | Slides

1. Flashbots Flash News Updates (20min)
   MEV Ship stewards will make a succinct presentation on the progress.

• Research update:
  • Evolution of MEV: from Miner Extractable Value to Maximum Extratable Value
  • Flashbots Research Proposals (FRPs) submitted
• Engineering update:
  • Special Purpose Vessel: MEV-Search
• Organization update: The Flashbots Rulebook (WIP)

2. MEV Ship Community Presentation (15min)
   Each Roast we will invite MEV Ship research collective members to present MEV-related projects they are working on or interesting early stage proposals for community feedback.

• Title: Protocol Rights Token
• Presenters: Dan Elitzer & Austin Williams
• Description: Present for feedback an early design of a mechanism that uses NFTs assigned via Harberger taxes as a solution to certain classes of MEV issues. The mechanism may also have applications beyond MEV.

3. MEV Roast (50 min)
   Each Roast we will invite an ecosystem stakeholder on-board to the Roast to provide constructive criticism on Flashbots' work.

• Roast Master of the week: Dan Elitzer
• Roast Questions:
  1. How much burden of minimizing MEV should be placed at the network level vs the contract/application level?
  2. In the near-to-mid term, should all high-volume front-end applications start routing directly to mining pools the way 1inch is doing?
  3. What would be the impact of infrastructure of traditional financial markets starting to make its way into crypto, such as Payment for Order Flow to wallets or interfaces? (h/t Trent Elmore)
  4. What is the likelihood of advances in cryptographic techniques enabling a meaningful reduction in MEV, vs addressing MEV primarily through game theory and economic mechanism design?
  5. Does the practice of node and mining pool operators actively sorting/filtering transactions based on their outcomes make it harder to fight back against the STABLE ACT or other future legislation that looks to hold nodes and validators accountable for certain types of transactions? (h/t Alex Lindgren)

miners for fastMode

Is there any list of miners for fastMode , can get such info from doc or discord .

The reason is after testing fastMode more than 30 days with 50+ tx , it look like only [Ethermine] mined my fastMode tx.

Thanks.

MEV Roast 10 Agenda

MEV Ship Treasure Map Roast X
Date: Thursday, Jan 14
Time: 11:30am EST / 8:30am PST / 4:30pm UTC / 12:30am China Standard Time

Conference Link | Slides | Flashbots Calendar

1. Flashbots Flash News Updates (30min)
   Flashbots stewards will make a succinct presentation on the progress.

• Organization update (5min):
  • Journey of Flashbots: research & engineering timeline
• Engineering update (20min):
  • Flashbots Alpha release: MEV-geth & MEV-relay
  • How to write a Flashbots MEV searcher: A tour of Flashbots searcher tooling (WIP)
  • Saving Kitties stuck in Merkle trees with Flashbots: the first ever white hat rescue of NFTs

2. MEV Ship Community Presentation & QA (20min)
   Each Roast we will invite MEV Ship research collective members to present MEV-related projects they are working on or interesting early stage proposals for community feedback.

• Presenting project: B.protocol
• Presenters: Yaron Velner (slides)
• Description: Insights from designing and implementing a decentralized backstop liquidity protocol.

3. MEV Roast (40 min)
   Each Roast we will invite an ecosystem stakeholder on-board to the Roast to provide constructive criticism on Flashbots' work.

• Roast Master of the week: Tom Schmidt (in absentia)
• Roast Questions:
  Q1. In every problem space, there are known unknowns and unknown unknowns. Flashbots is currently uncovering the known unknowns around MEV. How large do you anticipate the unknown unknowns are in relation to the known?
  Q2. In a potential future world where the majority of economic activity on Ethereum moves to an L2 w/ built-in sequencing, what’s the role of generalized L1 MEV tools?
  Q3. Should protocols and their users have rights to protocol-specific MEV / should a portion of MEV go back to users or the DAO? If so, how might such a mechanism work?
  Q4. In some ways, MEV resembles something like climate change: a looming existential collective action problem, but with negative effects that are too difficult to feel on an individual or local level. What’s the most important thing we need to do to get people to care?

Flashbots Community Call Agenda

Flashbots is an open research collective, and is committed to iterate in the public. This is our first monthly Community Call, where we share the latest progress, and how as a developer, researcher, miner, DeFi trader / bot operator in the ecosystem can get involved.

Flashbots Community Call & MEV Searcher Workshop
Time: 9am PST / noon EST / 5pm UTC on Mar 4, 2021
Conference Link | Slides | Flashbots Calendar

1. Flashbots Progress Update (30min)

• Organization update (5min)
• Engineering update (10min)
  • Flashbots Alpha
    • Metrics and numbers (February Transparency update preview)
    • MEV-geth: rebase to Geth v1.10.0 & documentation update
    • MEV-relay: v2.0.0 release
    • Miner support: FAQ & documentation
    • Searcher support: libraries, reference implementation & beginner's guide
• Flashbots ecosystem
  • MEV-explore v0 (explore.flashbots.net)
    • Get Involved: Feedback forum / Github issues / Flashbots Discord
  • MEV-inspect: "Where's Waldo" misclassification bounty program
• Research update (5min)
  • Collective MEV research: directions and progress
  • MEV Fellowship II
• Flashbots AMA (10min)

2. MEV Searcher Workshop (30min)

• Investigate existing blocks created by Flashbots, compare with conventional blocks
• Directly using the two Flashbots-specific RPC endpoints: eth_sendBundle and eth_callBundle
• Live demonstration of a 0-gas-price compromised account token rescue

3. AMA

Unable to decode bundle

Hey,

When simulating a bundle, everything works just fine, however, when submitting it using:

    const bundleReceipt = await flashbotsProvider.sendRawBundle(
      signedBundle,
      targetBlockNumber
    );

Then I get the following error message:

{ error: { message: 'unable to decode bundle', code: -32000 } }

I instantiate my flashbotsProvider as follows:

    const flashbotsProvider = await FlashbotsBundleProvider.create(
      await alchemy.config.getProvider(),
      new Wallet(process.env.SIGNER_PRIVATE_KEY, alchemy)
    );

Any thoughts?

Proposal: formalize a 'Flashbots' Service Provider and User Guidelines

Formalizing a Flashbots Service Provider and User Guidelines Rulebook

@notice Disclaimer: this is not legal advice, I am not a lawyer / attorney / barrister. **
@note 'Application' refers to the flashbots network and relay

An early draft as discussed in #65, formalizing policies and relationships are important both on-chain and off. However the principles outlined here do not cover the commodification of the flashbots service, that is to say it focuses more on facilitating fair market structure than implementing effective guidelines that clearly prohibit certain actions as stated in the proposal itself:

^{Originally posted by thegostep April 14, 2021}
(...)
Fair Market Principles for MEV is required in the Flashbots Alpha due to the technical limitations in the early stage of the project which are mitigated on the basis of trust. Flashbots aims to eliminate these trust requirements in future releases of the system.

Block producers connected to the Flashbots Alpha are expected to act in the best interest of the Flashbots network, the Ethereum network, and its various stakeholders. Namely, the Flashbots network aims to uphold the properties of fairness, efficiency, transparency, and permissionlessness. Block producers participating in the Flashbots Alpha are expected to collaborate in the development of an ecosystem for MEV extraction which reinforces the security and stability of the Ethereum network.

In the event of a breach of these principles by one of the block producers, the Flashbots core devs may act on behalf of stakeholders in disabling the access to the Flashbots network until the breach is rectified. The Flashbots core devs aim to provide technical support to block producers on a best effort basis to help resolve any technical issues.

Find the full proposal here: https://hackmd.io/@flashbots/fair-market-principles

A Preliminary outline

The following clauses and sections are subjects of interest to the entire community (both flashbots and the greater ethereum ecosystem in general). This is a first pass at outlining a policy framework that is modeled after existing practices (e.g. SLA agreements for B2B).

Principles and Statements

Conduct restrictions

forbidden actions includes examples of conducts that in principle are always against the law and may result in a prejudice to (flashbot's) interests.

User protection statements

By “user protection” we mean provisions to explicitly forbid activities that may be detrimental to other users of the service. All these options are already per se illegal, but stating them explicitly doesn’t hurt.

Scraping restrictions

Scraping is an automated process by which a software is able to scan and extract targeted information from websites. Although the distinction is not clear cut and most importantly not legally defined, while search engines – such as Google – crawl the web indistinctly to index pages and show them as search results, Scraping is usually targeted at a specific content or at one or more specific websites.

However, scraping is not per se illegal. Therefore, an accommodation should be made in which there is a user registration system whereby people looking to scrape data can be serviced in a separate subsystem/infrastructure so as to not compromise the health and liveness of the primary application.

Suggested addition for users in Australia (also beyond): no relationship of employment, agency or partnership created between the involved parties (this relates to searchers doing sponsored transactions)

Disclaimers of warranties, limitations of liability and indemnity

Specific liability limitations

(list with specific statements for liability limitation, going deep with examples and statements)

Any losses that are not the direct consequence of a breach of the Terms by the Owner.

Any loss of business opportunities and any other loss, even indirect, that may be incurred by the user (such as, but not limited to, trading losses, loss of revenue, income, profits or anticipated savings, loss of contracts or business relationships, loss of reputation or goodwill, etc.).

Damages or losses resulting from interruptions or malfunctions of the Application due to acts of force majeure, or unforeseen and unforeseeable events and, in any case, independent of the will and beyond the control of the Owner, such as, but not limited to, failures or disruptions of telephone or electrical lines, the Internet and / or other means of transmission, unavailability of websites, strikes, natural disasters, viruses and cyber attacks, interruptions in the delivery of products, third-party services or applications.

• Statement that places some responsibility on users to implement sufficient security and malware practices

• Limitation of liability to compensation for B2B cases

Acceptable use

Conduct restrictions

This first group of forbidden actions includes conducts that in principle are always against the law and may result in a prejudice to (flashbots) interests.

• Excessive use

• Excessive use of the service

• Excessive use of the API

“Acceptable use” statement (also sometimes called forbidden use if framed negatively). This should define what users may do on or with "your application", in order to be able to take actions against them if they violate the rules.

By “user protection” we mean provisions to explicitly forbid activities that may be detrimental to other users of the service. All these options are already per se illegal, but stating them explicitly doesn’t hurt.

End of Draft

Thank you for taking the time to read this,

Sam

Discord invite link is dead in README

What happens when one of the txs in a flashbot bundle?

If one of the transactions in the flashbot bundle fails, will the status of Ethereum be rolled back? For example, if the thrid transaction fails in a bundle, will the first two transactions also be rolled back?

Flashbots Community Call Agenda

Flashbots is an open research collective, and is committed to iterate in the public. This is our third monthly Community Call, where we share the latest progress, and how as a developer, researcher, miner, DeFi trader / bot operator in the ecosystem can get involved.

Flashbots Community Call & Flashbots Dashboard Release
Time: 9am PT / noon ET / 3pm UTC on May 13, 2021
Conference Link | Slides | Transparency Report | Flashbots Calendar

1. Flashbots Transparency Dashboard v0 release: dashboard.flashbots.net (15min)
2. Flashbots Progress Update (20min)

• Flashbots Core Product Releases
  • v0.2 release
    • Bundle merging
    • Websocket
    • Strict profit switching
• Flashbots documentation site: docs.flashbots.net

3. Research Update (10 min)
4. AMA (15min)

MEV Roast 12 Agenda: MEV from A to Z

Date: Thursday, Feb 25
Time: 11:30am EST / 8:30am PST / 4:30pm UTC / 12:30am China Standard Time

Tl;dr: How large is MEV? Why does MEV matter as a security metric to protocol designers and users? What is the animal mascot for MEV and why is a platypus the correct answer? Follow the release of MEV-explore v0 (explore.flashbots.net) this week, join us on an exploratory tour of MEV with Flashbots & Roast Master Hudson Jameson into the methods and preliminary results of quantifying MEV: from the currently Extracted MEV to the Total Extractable MEV in any given block.

MEV Roast is a monthly tradition from the MEV Pi-rate Ship, a neutral, chain-agnostic, interdisciplinary research collective that supports MEV-related theoretical and empirical research.

Conference Link | Flashbots Calendar | Slides

Part 0: Introduction & Memes (10min)

• MEV Russian Doll: a Strawman decomposition
• Flashbots & MEV

Part 1. MEV: from A to Z (50min)
Each Roast we will invite MEV Ship research collective members to present insights from MEV-related research they are working on or interesting early stage proposals for community feedback.

• Extracted Value: quantifying on-chain MEV activities on Ethereum
  • Navigator: Alex Obadia (Slides) (10min)
  • Roast Q&A (10min)
• Extractable Value: Clockwork Finance - A Mechanized Framework for Economic Security in Smart Contracts (8min)
  • Navigator: Phil Daian (Slides) (15min)
  • Roast Q&A (15min)

Part 2. Roast Questions (30min)
Q1: Can a contract or program be developed that detects different types of MEV and instructs a contract to reverse transactions that front run, censor, or re-order transactions?
Q2: Does MEV include information that hasn’t hit the chain yet, such as a transaction from a separate chain, like Cosmos or Avalanche, that is clearly on it’s way to Ethereum, is there new ways for miners to look at other chain's bridge transactions to get rewarded? Can patterns develop outside of the enclosed main protocol that can influence protocol level actions?
Q3: If a miner is looking at an oracle feed and knows or can delay the oracle data result, is that MEV? Example: Betting on the sports game and a miner can bet on a game’s outcome before the oracle settles the game if they know what the oracle is about to say?
Q4: Have mining pools openly admitted to doing MEV tactics to increase their profits and if so, what position do they take with regards to MEV?
Q5: What is the animal mascot for MEV and why is a platypus the correct answer?

More resources:
Past MEV Roasts recaps | MEV Research Vault

reason: 'bad response', code: 'SERVER_ERROR',

Can i get help about this one? Ive done everything allright. Bundle is live, address added, weth added, and when im trying to run NPM Start im getting this:

Send this much WETH 2000000000000000000 get this much profit 4209896913625831308
{
targets: [
'0x1498bd576454159Bb81B5Ce532692a8752D163e8',
'0x7D7E813082eF6c143277c71786e5bE626ec77b20'
],
payloads: [
'0x022c0d9f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007f51f83afdf1767bce00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007d7e813082ef6c143277c71786e5be626ec77b2000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000',
'0x022c0d9f0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000562dfc576c76578c000000000000000000000000643d0e4f66ea66639956b18b63654ef41447024600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000'
]
}
[
{
signer: Wallet {
_isSigner: true,
_signingKey: [Function (anonymous)],
_mnemonic: [Function (anonymous)],
address: '0x44ab46720D8FAcE0BB4377E771Cab211f0BCC208',
provider: null
},
transaction: {
data: '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',
to: '0x643D0e4f66Ea66639956b18b63654ef414470246',
gasLimit: [BigNumber],
gasPrice: [BigNumber]
}
}
]
Error: bad response (status=400, headers={"date":"Thu, 17 Feb 2022 19:39:25 GMT","content-type":"application/json","content-length":"80","connection":"close","x-amzn-requestid":"327b87b5-4a58-419e-aa3f-ccbbf02a7afc","x-amz-apigw-id":"Ns6hMFXuiYcFqhQ=","x-amzn-trace-id":"Root=1-620ea46d-18a5f1f70d774562026e42af;Sampled=0","cf-cache-status":"DYNAMIC","expect-ct":"max-age=604800, report-uri="https://report-uri.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/beacon/expect-ct\"","report-to":"{\"endpoints\":[{\"url\":\"https:\\/\\/a.nel.cloudflare.com\\/report\\/v3?s=4waeiOjdz5UpRBfHVDlG6qRp3J%2F4JttYjSxW%2BrODSU%2B5ixOXQ1WehKLi1uRW%2FZP6XsGY%2FvuwCYHPN4pc9%2FJtqWJiXnxdusQuOfR5sOZWDeTqGnvVRQyyEgEsp8tbCDhmN1frzGo%3D\"}],\"group\":\"cf-nel\",\"max_age\":604800}","nel":"{\"success_fraction\":0,\"report_to\":\"cf-nel\",\"max_age\":604800}","server":"cloudflare","cf-ray":"6df17b4bffba7807-VIE"}, body="{"error":"invalid gas price, 0 gas price txs no longer accepted after eip-1559"}", requestBody="{"method":"eth_callBundle","params":[{"txs":["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"],"blockNumber":"0xd910a3","stateBlockNumber":"latest"}],"id":44,"jsonrpc":"2.0"}", requestMethod="POST", url="https://relay.flashbots.net", code=SERVER_ERROR, version=web/5.0.11)
at Logger.makeError (/home/snnick/Desktop/simple-arbitrage-master/node_modules/@ethersproject/logger/src.ts/index.ts:205:28)
at Logger.throwError (/home/snnick/Desktop/simple-arbitrage-master/node_modules/@ethersproject/logger/src.ts/index.ts:217:20)
at /home/snnick/Desktop/simple-arbitrage-master/node_modules/@ethersproject/web/src.ts/index.ts:251:24
at step (/home/snnick/Desktop/simple-arbitrage-master/node_modules/@ethersproject/web/lib/index.js:33:23)
at Object.next (/home/snnick/Desktop/simple-arbitrage-master/node_modules/@ethersproject/web/lib/index.js:14:53)
at fulfilled (/home/snnick/Desktop/simple-arbitrage-master/node_modules/@ethersproject/web/lib/index.js:5:58)
at processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:96:5) {
reason: 'bad response',
code: 'SERVER_ERROR',
status: 400,
headers: {
date: 'Thu, 17 Feb 2022 19:39:25 GMT',
'content-type': 'application/json',
'content-length': '80',
connection: 'close',
'x-amzn-requestid': '327b87b5-4a58-419e-aa3f-ccbbf02a7afc',
'x-amz-apigw-id': 'Ns6hMFXuiYcFqhQ=',
'x-amzn-trace-id': 'Root=1-620ea46d-18a5f1f70d774562026e42af;Sampled=0',
'cf-cache-status': 'DYNAMIC',
'expect-ct': 'max-age=604800, report-uri="https://report-uri.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/beacon/expect-ct"',
'report-to': '{"endpoints":[{"url":"https:\/\/a.nel.cloudflare.com\/report\/v3?s=4waeiOjdz5UpRBfHVDlG6qRp3J%2F4JttYjSxW%2BrODSU%2B5ixOXQ1WehKLi1uRW%2FZP6XsGY%2FvuwCYHPN4pc9%2FJtqWJiXnxdusQuOfR5sOZWDeTqGnvVRQyyEgEsp8tbCDhmN1frzGo%3D"}],"group":"cf-nel","max_age":604800}',
nel: '{"success_fraction":0,"report_to":"cf-nel","max_age":604800}',
server: 'cloudflare',
'cf-ray': '6df17b4bffba7807-VIE'
},
body: '{"error":"invalid gas price, 0 gas price txs no longer accepted after eip-1559"}',
requestBody: '{"method":"eth_callBundle","params":[{"txs":["0xf90365808082c8c094643d0e4f66ea66639956b18b63654ef41447024680b90304ecd494b30000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001bc16d674ec800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002ebd3f267e2512d6000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020000000000000000000000001498bd576454159bb81b5ce532692a8752d163e80000000000000000000000007d7e813082ef6c143277c71786e5be626ec77b2000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000040000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a4022c0d9f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007f51f83afdf1767bce00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007d7e813082ef6c143277c71786e5be626ec77b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a4022c0d9f0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000562dfc576c76578c000000000000000000000000643d0e4f66ea66639956b18b63654ef41447024600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001ca03944478c7a81b31d14440c6cd5a29179a9d58eda00cfd9a3abac19c584ca8122a0143ea32e3be8a1bab334474dd50c272603dc14f20393340219b604cc79daf134"],"blockNumber":"0xd910a3","stateBlockNumber":"latest"}],"id":44,"jsonrpc":"2.0"}',
requestMethod: 'POST',
url: 'https://relay.flashbots.net'

MEV GETH on Binance Smart Chain

Hi, may I know do you have the MEV GETH on Binance Smart Chain?
As I am running a full node on BSC now, and I hope Flashbots to support Binance Smart Chain because I found many front running MEV happening on Binance Smart Chain too.

Using flashbots as a backdoor path to account abstraction

One of the long-running desires of many in the Ethereum protocol community is to add some form of account abstraction. Account abstraction (see also: this video where I talk about the concept) is the idea that instead of every transaction needing to start from an "externally-owned account" (EOA) controlled by a private key, transactions could start directly from contracts (and EOAs could eventually even be deprecated entirely).

There are many use cases for this: smart contract wallets (eg. see here where I make the case for social recovery wallets), privacy-preserving tools like Tornado Cash, etc. Today, smart contract wallets are difficult to use because a transaction must start from an EOA, and the EOA must pay the gas fees, so someone using a smart contract wallet must have some of their ETH in an EOA to pay for gas, adding significant complexity (and wasted gas). Centralized relayers can mitigate this to some extent, but some inefficiency ultimately still remains.

Flashbots can solve this! Flashbots is basically a very powerful and more efficient generalized and decentralized relayer protocol, and it should be possible to build a plugin to turn it into a relayer for smart contract wallets:

• When a user wants to make an action with a smart contract wallet, they generate the ABI encoding of the function call to their wallet. This ABI encoding contains:
  • The target, calldata and gaslimit (or an array of each, if they want to make multiple calls)
  • A fee, a quantity of ETH that the wallet sends to the block.coinbase (post-EIP-1559 this could be extended to max_total_fee and miner_bribe)
  • The signature (or multiple signatures), which the contract wallet verifies
• The user publishes a package containing this ABI encoding and their smart contract wallet address to a specialized p2p subnet, which only rebroadcasts encodings if they follow some rules that guarantee that they actually will pay a sufficient fee if included.
• Specialized flashbots relayers that "speak" this sub-protocol would live on this network and package proposals consisting of these packages. To save gas, they could simply make a single wrapper transaction that includes all of the calls.

There is a lot of room for creativity in what those verification rules could be. One simple option is to check for four conditions:

1. The fee is sufficiently high
2. The contract wallet fits a template that shows that it can accept the encoding
3. The contract has enough funds to pay the fee
4. If you execute the contract, the execution gets past the signature verification stage

Another option is more limited but simpler: if the total gaslimit is low enough (eg. under 400000?), the system could simply check that the block.coinbase's balance increases by a sufficient amount during transaction execution. This could allow the privacy-preserving use cases as well as smart contract wallet creation.

This could give us most of the benefits of account abstraction without needing to make deep changes to the Ethereum protocol itself (eg. EIP 2938), and so it seems worth making a serious effort to explore and implement.

parallel transactions

the documentation says that I can send transactions to the public mempool and flashbot mempool in parallel, but if I do this, then in 100% of cases a transaction from the public pool is executed, even if the private transaction has a higher commission. can you help me?

Broken link to simple arbitrage example in Searchers Onboarding document

The current searchers onboarding document contains a broken link to the flashbots/simple-arbitrage project:

Simple-arbitrage-searcher example bot we've open-sourced here: simple-arbitrage-searcher

The link currently points to the guides directory but it should probably point to the actual project: flashbots/simple-arbitrage.

Internal Server Error

`const flashbotsProvider = await FlashbotsBundleProvider.create(
provider,
authSigner,
// 使用主网 Flashbots，需要把下面两行删去
'https://relay-sepolia.flashbots.net/',
'sepolia'
);

// EIP 1559 transaction
const transaction0 = {
chainId: 11155111,
type: 2,
to: "0xC1c4301C5bd4eBe2C04817aC815AaceB4DeDA8DB",
value: ethers.utils.parseEther("0.001"),
maxFeePerGas: GWEI * 100n
}

// 5. 创建交易 Bundle
const transactionBundle = [
{
signer: wallet, // ethers signer
transaction: transaction0 // ethers populated transaction object
}
// 也可以加入mempool中签名好的交易（可以是任何人发送的）
// ,{
// signedTransaction: SIGNED_ORACLE_UPDATE_FROM_PENDING_POOL // serialized signed transaction hex
// }
]

// 6. 模拟交易，交易模拟成功后才能执行
// 签名交易
const signedTransactions = await flashbotsProvider.signBundle(transactionBundle)
// 设置交易的目标执行区块（在哪个区块执行）
const targetBlockNumber = (await provider.getBlockNumber()) + 1
// 模拟
const simulation = await flashbotsProvider.simulate(signedTransactions, targetBlockNumber)`

the resualt log :

body: '{"error":"Internal Server Error"}',

MEV Roast 14 Agenda - Scaling Ethereum Edition

Date: Thursday, May 6
Time: 11:30am ET / 8:30am PT / 3:30pm UTC / 11:30pm China Standard Time
Roast Master: Justin Drake

MEV Roast is a monthly tradition from the MEV Pi-rate Ship, a neutral, chain-agnostic, interdisciplinary research collective that supports MEV-related theoretical and empirical research.

Slides | Watch Stream | Subscribe to Flashbots Calendar

Part 0: Introduction & Memes (10min)

• MEV Roast: Scaling Ethereum Edition (Introduction)

Part 1. MEV and ETH2 (65min)
Each Roast we will invite MEV Ship research collective members to present insights from MEV-related research they are working on or interesting early stage proposals for community feedback.

• MEV is Fundamental to Permissionless Systems

  • Navigator: Phil Daian (Slides | Post)

• MEV and ETH2

  • Navigator: Alex Obadia (Slides)

• MEV and Scaling Ethereum

  • Panelists: Vitalik Buterin, Phil Daian, Justin Drake

Part 2: MEV on Rollups and Beyond (75min)

• MEV Minimization on L2: solution space & design contraints

  • Navigator: Eli Ben-Sasson (Slides)

• From MEV Auction (MEVA) to Sequencer MEV Extraction

  • Navigator: Karl Floersch (Slides | Post)

• Defining the MEV Game on L2

  • Navigator: Georgios Konstantopoulos (Slides)

• The MEV game on L2: bots, users, sequencers dynamics

  • Georgios Konstantopoulos, Barry Whitehat, Stani Kulechov, David Goldberg (Synthetix: MEV Notes | Highlight )
  • Panel Questions:
    • What kinds of MEV do major DeFi platforms expose today?
    • Most Rollup L2s promise instant transaction confirmation by having the sequencer commit on including transactions on a first come first serve basis. Does this affect your user base?
    • What countermeasures have Aave and Synthetix introduced, or are thinking to introduce in order to reduce their MEV surface?
    • How would you compare the MEV exposed by an Optimistic Rollup protocol, vs an ZK rollup protocol. Do fraud proofs have any fatal weakness in your opinion?
    • When evaluating an L2 protocol to use, do you take its MEV mitigation measures into account?

Extra Credit: Roast Questions from the Roast Master:
😊 The questions below have purposefully abrasive language to fit the "roast" theme. 😊

• Why does the Flashbots definition of MEV not include all extractable value such as native EVM fees? It's confusing and wrong—please fix.
• Can we stop celebrating the gas savings from off chain PGAs? Those gas savings are minimal, <1% of gas usage. (Source: MEV-Explore v0)
• Can we please stop propagating the misconception that the MEV power hierarchy ends with all-powerful block builders? This is FUD. The power hierarchy is user < bot < block builder < dApp < VM. We primarily need to focus on better dApp designs as well as VM-level MEV minimisation and extraction such as EIP-1559.
• Can Flashbots leadership tone down concave thinking such as "MEV is fundamental" and "fairness is impossible". We only need good-enough fairness and good-enough MEV minimisation.
• Can the centralisation risks that stem from Flashbots block proposer whitelisting in the context of Eth2 be properly acknowledged and taken more seriously?
• Flashbots REV only provides a 5.2% increase in miner revenue. Do you find these REV numbers compelling enough to justify the huge Flashbots effort?
• Can flashbots.net be friendlier to non-devs as opposed to a redirect to a Github repo?

More Resources:
Past MEV Roasts recaps | MEV Research Vault | MEV-Explore v0

MEV Roast 8 Agenda

MEV Ship Treasure Map Roast VIII
Date: Wednesday, Nov 25
Time: 1:30pm EST / 10:30am PST / 6:30pm UTC

Subscribe to Flashbots Calendar | MEV Roast Slides

1. Flashbots Flash News Updates (25min)
   MEV Ship stewards will make a succinct presentation on the progress.

• Organization update
• Research update
• Engineering update: MEV Geth & MEV Inspect

2. MEV Roast (45 min)
   Each week we will invite an ecosystem stakeholder on-board to the Roast to provide constructive criticism on Flashbots' work.

• Roast Master of the week: Dan Robinson @danrobinson
• Roast Questions:

3. The Lookout (15 min)
   Discussion on uphill open-ended questions or AMA.

Update ethresearch post and mev-geth readme for consistency to reflect mev-relay

Currently both mev-geth repo and ethresearch post instruct miners/mining pool to publish endpoint directly, whereas the implementation of Flashbots alpha suggests registering on MEV-relay.

Incorrect link to pokt.newtork in README.md

The link to pokt.network in README.md is treated as a relative link because it is missing a URI scheme. This brings it to a non-existent file in the repository named pokt.network. I forked and changed the link, but I haven't submitted a pull request, because CONTRIBUTING.md said to submit an issue first.

Flashbot bundle is not included because "isSendToMiners" is false?

I'm trying to send a flashbot Bundle with several transactions. I use the following code to sign and send a bundle:

 const signedTransactions = await flashbotsProvider.signBundle([
    {
      signer: MyWallet,
      transaction: firstTx
    },
    {
      signer: MyWallet,
      transaction: secondTx
    },
    {
      signer: MyWallet,
      transaction: thirdTx
    }]);
    const targetBlockNumber = block.number; 
    const simulation = await flashbotsProvider.simulate(
      signedTransactions,
      targetBlockNumber + 1
    )

    console.log(simulation);
    console.log("bundleHash: ", simulation.bundleHash);

    for (var i = 1; i <= 10; i++) {

      console.log(">>>>>> ", i);

      const bundleSubmission = await flashbotsProvider.sendRawBundle(
        signedTransactions,
        targetBlockNumber + i
      )
      console.log('bundle submitted, waiting', bundleSubmission.bundleHash)

      const waitResponse = await bundleSubmission.wait()
      console.log(`Wait Response: ${FlashbotsBundleResolution[waitResponse]}`)
      if (
        waitResponse === FlashbotsBundleResolution.BundleIncluded ||
        waitResponse === FlashbotsBundleResolution.AccountNonceTooHigh
      ) {
        console.log('Bundle included!')
        process.exit(0)
      } else {

        console.log(">>>", simulation.bundleHash);

        console.log({
          bundleStats: await flashbotsProvider.getBundleStats(
            simulation.bundleHash,
            targetBlockNumber + 1,
          ),
          userStats: await flashbotsProvider.getUserStats(),
        })
      }
    }

The simulation is successful. However, In order to ensure that the bundle can be included, I for loop 10 times to send a new bundle in case the previous bundle fails. It seems that the bundles are not included because they are not sent to the miners(isSentToMiners is false). Why does this happen?

bundleHash:  0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
>>>>>>  1
bundle submitted, waiting 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
Wait Response: BlockPassedWithoutInclusion
>>> 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
{
  bundleStats: {
    isHighPriority: true,
    isSentToMiners: false,
    isSimulated: true,
    simulatedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.241Z',
    submittedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.233Z'
  },
  userStats: {
    all_time_gas_simulated: '',
    all_time_miner_payments: '',
    is_high_priority: false,
    last_1d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_1d_miner_payments: '',
    last_7d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_7d_miner_payments: ''
  }
}
>>>>>>  2
bundle submitted, waiting 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
Wait Response: BlockPassedWithoutInclusion
>>> 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
{
  bundleStats: {
    isHighPriority: true,
    isSentToMiners: false,
    isSimulated: true,
    simulatedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.241Z',
    submittedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.233Z'
  },
  userStats: {
    all_time_gas_simulated: '',
    all_time_miner_payments: '',
    is_high_priority: false,
    last_1d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_1d_miner_payments: '',
    last_7d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_7d_miner_payments: ''
  }
}
>>>>>>  3
bundle submitted, waiting 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
Wait Response: BlockPassedWithoutInclusion
>>> 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
{
  bundleStats: {
    isHighPriority: true,
    isSentToMiners: false,
    isSimulated: true,
    simulatedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.241Z',
    submittedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.233Z'
  },
  userStats: {
    all_time_gas_simulated: '',
    all_time_miner_payments: '',
    is_high_priority: false,
    last_1d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_1d_miner_payments: '',
    last_7d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_7d_miner_payments: ''
  }
}
>>>>>>  4
bundle submitted, waiting 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
Wait Response: BlockPassedWithoutInclusion
>>> 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
{
  bundleStats: {
    isHighPriority: true,
    isSentToMiners: false,
    isSimulated: true,
    simulatedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.241Z',
    submittedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.233Z'
  },
  userStats: {
    all_time_gas_simulated: '',
    all_time_miner_payments: '',
    is_high_priority: false,
    last_1d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_1d_miner_payments: '',
    last_7d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_7d_miner_payments: ''
  }
}
>>>>>>  5
bundle submitted, waiting 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
Wait Response: BlockPassedWithoutInclusion
>>> 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
{
  bundleStats: {
    isHighPriority: true,
    isSentToMiners: false,
    isSimulated: true,
    simulatedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.241Z',
    submittedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.233Z'
  },
  userStats: {
    all_time_gas_simulated: '',
    all_time_miner_payments: '',
    is_high_priority: false,
    last_1d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_1d_miner_payments: '',
    last_7d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_7d_miner_payments: ''
  }
}
>>>>>>  6
bundle submitted, waiting 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
Wait Response: BlockPassedWithoutInclusion
>>> 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
{
  bundleStats: {
    isHighPriority: true,
    isSentToMiners: false,
    isSimulated: true,
    simulatedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.241Z',
    submittedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.233Z'
  },
  userStats: {
    all_time_gas_simulated: '',
    all_time_miner_payments: '',
    is_high_priority: false,
    last_1d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_1d_miner_payments: '',
    last_7d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_7d_miner_payments: ''
  }
}
>>>>>>  7
bundle submitted, waiting 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
Wait Response: BlockPassedWithoutInclusion
>>> 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
{
  bundleStats: {
    isHighPriority: true,
    isSentToMiners: false,
    isSimulated: true,
    simulatedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.241Z',
    submittedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.233Z'
  },
  userStats: {
    all_time_gas_simulated: '',
    all_time_miner_payments: '',
    is_high_priority: false,
    last_1d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_1d_miner_payments: '',
    last_7d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_7d_miner_payments: ''
  }
}
>>>>>>  8
bundle submitted, waiting 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
Wait Response: BlockPassedWithoutInclusion
>>> 0x012ca7ac493afc4bf288bb9cde4b49d521d1c12c01d66705d8fbd3bdfb1c6112
{
  bundleStats: {
    isHighPriority: true, 
    isSentToMiners: false,
    isSimulated: true,    
    simulatedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.241Z',
    submittedAt: '2023-02-12T08:03:16.233Z'
  },
  userStats: {
    all_time_gas_simulated: '',
    all_time_miner_payments: '',
    is_high_priority: false,
    last_1d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_1d_miner_payments: '',
    last_7d_gas_simulated: '',
    last_7d_miner_payments: ''
  }
}

my first flashbots example(transfer), has not been successful

Hello everyone:
Please help me with a question:

1. I'm testing the first flashbots example (it's an example of transfer): eth_sendBundle interface has not been successful.
   ----it is ok

My metamask is compromised, I got only two days after that my funds are coming out from the pool, that was done by the hacker, I added funds but the hacker is using or a flashbot or sweeper. Can someone help me with this issue before I lose everything? Thanks in advance.

Flashbots Community Call Agenda

Flashbots is an open research collective, and is committed to iterate in the public. This is our first monthly Community Call, where we share the latest progress, and how as a developer, researcher, miner, DeFi trader / bot operator in the ecosystem can get involved.

Flashbots Community Call & MEV Searcher Workshop
Time: 9am PT / noon ET / 3pm UTC on Apr 15, 2021
Conference Link | Slides | Flashbots Calendar

1. Flashbots Progress Update (30min)

• Organization update (5min)
• Research Update (5 min)
  • MEV Taxonomy: Quantifying Realized Extractable Value
  • MEV Fellowship II Grantees
• Flashbots Core Product Releases (20 min)
  • MEV-geth v1.10.1-mev3 patch release: to resolve the issue around one block re-orgs which may increase uncle rate
  • Flashbots Core v0.2 draft proposal, with a structured upgrade process, split into a 2-part release
    • a) v0.2 pre-release: MEV-geth v1.10.2-mev0.2-pre1
    • b) v0.2 release: Request for Comments
    • Flashbots Fair Market Principles
  • Flashbots Engineering Roadmap
• Flashbots Transparency
  • Blocks.flashbots.net api update to change numeric ETH fields to strings to preserve precision (h/t to @satofishi)
  • Flashbots Transparency Dashboard (WIP)
  • Etherscan released flashbots labels
  • Community Driven Dune Analytics Metrics
• Flashbots Community
  • White hat league
  • White hat tooling
  • EthGlobal Scaling Hackathon

2. Sneak Peek Preview of Flashbots Transparency Dashboard (15min)

3. AMA (15min)

Cannot send private transactions which include an access-list

I am attempting eth_sendPrivateTransaction with transactions which include an accessList (on ethereum/mainnet).

No matter how much I increase the maxFeePerGas and maxPriorityFeePerGas values, these transactions always end up showing "status":"FAILED" on the Transaction Status API webpage (at https://protect.flashbots.net/tx).

Is there any knows issue around this?

Thanks.

An example transaction:

https://protect.flashbots.net/tx/0x34ae719a2639a3047a2383442acbc315bcef5cd3890a25264b17152bd5a152a6

MEV Roast 11 Agenda

MEV Ship Treasure Map Roast 11
Date: Thursday, Jan 28
Time: 11:30am EST / 8:30am PST / 4:30pm UTC / 12:30am China Standard Time

Conference Link | Slides | Flashbots Calendar

Part 1. Privacy for MEV Minimization (65min)
Each Roast we will invite MEV Ship research collective members to present MEV-related projects they are working on or interesting early stage proposals for community feedback.

• Trade-offs between Privacy Solution at the Mempool Layer
  • Navigator: Sunny Aggarwal - Sikka (10min)
  • Roast Q&A (15min)
• VeeDo Time-lock to the Rescue - Starkware (8min)
  • Roast Q&A (5min)
• Secret Network MEV Solution - Secret Network (8min)
  • Roast Q&A (5min)
• Beating Frontrunning with Threshold Decryption - Sikka (8min)
  • Roast Q&A (5min)

Part 2. Workshop: How to achieve full-privacy in creating seal-bid MEV Auction? (25min)

• Flashbots proposes to create an efficient, transparent, permissionless and trustless communication channel for tx order preference. But, how can we hide the transaction bundle from miners/validators?
  • Flashbots OG Treasure Map: an SGX spec
  • Committee-based threshold encryption?
  • Relay withholding?

More resources:
Past MEV Roasts recaps | MEV Research Vault

add auction mechanism description to Flashbots alpha guide