laplacekorea / ecgfp5

Curve ecGFp5

Curve ecGFp5

EcGFp5 is an elliptic curve defined over the field GF(p^5), for the prime p = 2^64 - 2^32 + 1. This curve was designed to efficiently support systems with a special compute model where operations in GF(p) are especially efficient. One such system is the Miden VM, which is used to produce and verify zero-knowledge proofs (of the STARK kind). EcGFp5 is not inherently tied to Miden, but that compute model served as inspiration for the curve choice.

• The curve design and choice is explained in the whitepaper.

• A test implementation, in Python, is provided in the python directory. It emulates operations as they are meant to occur within the target compute model (the "VM") and counts costs, expressed in such operations.

• A reference implementation in Rust (optimized and constant-time, but portable) is provided in the rust directory. It implements all operations on curve elements needed to implement, for instance, digital signatures.

Curve Parameters

EcGFp5 is a double-odd curve: it is best understood as a prime order group with efficient and constant-time group operations, as well as canonical encoding and decoding procedures.

Base modulus is p = 2^64 - 2^32 + 1 = 18446744069414584321.

Field GF(p^5) is defined as polynomials in GF(p)[z], for a symbolic variable z, of degree at most 4, and all computations performed modulo the irreducible polynomial M = z^5 - 3.

The curve equation is: y^2 = x*(x^2 + a*x + b) for the two constants a = 2 and b = 263*z. The total curve order is 2*n for a big 319-bit prime n:

n = 1067993516717146951041484916571792702745057740581727230159139685185762082554198619328292418486241

EcGFp5 itself is defined as a group of order exactly n, consisting of the points of the curve which are not points of n-torsion. The neutral element is the point N = (0, 0) (on the curve, this is the unique point of order 2). The sum of two points P and Q in the group is defined as P + Q + N on the curve. This yields a group with all needed properties for defining cryptographic operations such as key exchange or signatures:

• The group has a prime order (no cofactor!).

• Encoding and decoding of elements is canonical: each element can be encoded into a single sequence of bytes, and the decoding process succeeds only if provided that exact sequence of bytes.

• The group law can be applied with complete formulas, with no special case; the formulas are furthermore efficient (generic addition in 10M, amortized per-doubling cost in 2M+5S).

The conventional generator G is the unique point of the group such that y/x = 4 (there are exactly two such points on the base curve, but only one of them is in the prime-order group). Its coordinates are:

x = 12883135586176881569
  +  4356519642755055268*z
  +  5248930565894896907*z^2
  +  2165973894480315022*z^3
  +  2448410071095648785*z^4
y = 4*x

As described in the double-odd curves, there are several choices for internal coordinates. In general, the fractional (x,u) coordinates are recommended: an element is represented as the quadruplet (X:Z:U:T) with x = X/Z and u = x/y = U/T (with u = 0 for the neutral N); elements Z and T are never zero.

Rust Implementation

The rust directory contains a reference implementation of ecGFp5. It is portable: the code uses only core (not std) and has no architecture-dependent features (no assembly, intrinsics or anything tagged unsafe); it is nonetheless quite optimized. It does not require the "nightly" compiler. The main types are GFp (integers modulo the 64-bit integer p), GFp5 (elements of the GF(p^5) field), Point (group elements) and Scalar (integers modulo the prime group order n). The structures implement the usual traits (e.g. Add and AddAssign) so that arithmetic operators can be used on such values.

The implementation is considered secure (notably, everything is constant-time, except the functions meant to directly support signature verification, which nominally uses only public data). It shall be noted that there is no attempt whatsoever at "wiping memory", an action is believed in some circles to be an important security feature. At least, being a core-only implementation, there should be no dynamic memory allocation except on the stack, so that a blanket stack-wiping strategy after execution of curve-related code is feasible.

Compilation is straightforward (cargo build and so on). It can be beneficial to performance to add explicit compilation flags in order to leverage some architecture-specific opcodes, e.g. mulx on recent x86 CPUs (Intel Skylake and later); this is done by setting the RUSTFLAGS environment variable with the value -C target-cpu=native (but this, of course, prevents execution of the resulting binary on older CPUs that do not feature such opcodes).

There are benchmarks (cargo bench). These benchmarks use the intrinsic functions _mm_lfence() and _rdtsc() and will compile only on 64-bit x86 architectures. Moreover, they use the CPU cycle counter, which is known not to actually count cycles on CPUs that indulge in frequency scaling (aka "TurboBoost"): if you run the benchmarks on a machine that has TurboBoost enabled, the numbers you get are meaningless.

Signatures

The provided implementations do not include signature primitives. The main reason is that defining a signature scheme entails choosing a hash function, and it is expected that in-VM implementations will want to use a specialized hash function such as Poseidon or Rescue.

Given the hash function H with an output size of at least 320 bits, the Schnorr signatures work as follows:

• The private key is d, a non-zero scalar (integer modulo n). The public key is Q = d*G.

• To sign a message m (which may itself be already a hash value):

  1. Generate a new random non-zero k modulo n. The choice must be uniform (or indinstinguishable from uniform) amoung all integers modulo n. If a secure random source is not available, derandomization techniques can be used, such as described in RFC 6979. In this case, it may be convenient to hash together the private key, the public key and the message, and interpret the hash output as an integer, which is then reduced modulo n (assuming that the hash output is large enough that the reduction does not induce any notable bias; a 384-bit output is enough, since n has size 319 bits). In the Rust implementation, Scalar::decode_reduce() can perform the decoding and modular reduction.

  2. Compute point R = k*G. Since this uses the conventional generator, precomputed tables can be used to speed up the process; in the Rust code, use Point::mulgen().

  3. Encode R into the 40-byte sequence rbuf (use Point::encode() to encode the point R into an element of GF(p^5), then `GFp5::encode() to obtain 40 bytes).

  4. Hash (with H) the concatenation of rbuf, the encoding of Q, and the message m. The hash output is interpreted as an integer (e.g. with little-endian convention) which is reduced modulo n, yielding the scalar e.

  5. Compute the scalar s = k + d*e (all computations modulo n; in Rust, use the arithmetic operations on Scalar instances). The scalar s is encoded into the 40-byte value sbuf (with Scalar::encode()).

  6. The signature is the concatenation of rbuf and sbuf.

• To verify a signature over a message m, against a public key Q:

  1. Check that the signature has length exactly 80 bytes; split it into rbuf and sbuf.

  2. Decode rbuf into the point R (GFp5::decode(), then Point::decode()). Each decoding may fail, in case the value is invalid; a failed decoding implies that the signature is to be rejected.

  3. Decode sbuf into the scalar s (with Scalar::decode(), which may also fail if sbuf is not in the proper range).

  4. Hash the concatenation of rbuf, the encoding of Q, and the message m, and reduce the output modulo n. This recomputes the value e as in step 4 of the signature generation.

  5. Check that s*G - e*Q = R. In the Rust code, the function Point::verify_muladd_vartime() can be used (with scalars s and -e, and point R): this function applies an optimized process to speed up this operation. As the name indicate, this function is not constant-time, which is normally not a problem for signature verification, which uses only public data.